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A. MICHAEL FROOMKIN*

The Essential Role of Trusted Third
Parties in Electronic Commerce

B

Y now it is well known that the Internet is a global, but
insecure, network.'

It is also increasingly well understood

that cryptography 2 can contribute greatly to the ransactional security that Internet commerce so obviously lacks.3 What is less
well understood is that cryptography is only part of the security
story. Many cryptographic protocols for secure electronic transactions require at least one trusted third party to the transaction,
such as a bank or a "certification authority" (CA). These partly
cryptographic, partly social, protocols require new entities, or
new relationships with existing entities, but the duties and liabilities of those entities are uncertain. Until these uncertainties are
resolved, they risk inhibiting the spread of the most interesting
forms of electronic commerce and causing unnecessary litigation.
This Article aims to describe what CAs do, explain why they
* © A. Michael Froomkin, 1996. All rights reserved. Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law; B.A., 1982, Yale College; M.Phil., 1984, Cambridge
University; J.D., 1987, Yale Law School. Internet: froomkin@law.miami.edu. Tom
Baker, Caroline Bradley, Patrick Gudridge, Trotter Hardy, Richard Hausler, Francis
Hill, Mark Lemley, Jessica Litman, Charles Merrill, Daniel Murray, and Katie Sowle
provided helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to Alan
Asay, Bob Jueneman, Chuck Miller, and many other past and present members of
the ABA Information Security Committee for helpful discussions of many technical
questions; Richard Field, Hal Finney, and Lucky Green for sharing their expertise
regarding electronic cash and related matters; Ann Klienfelter, Claire Donnelly,
SueAnn Campbell and Nora de la Garza for reference and information retrieval
help; Rosalia Lliraldi for secretarial assistance; and Erica Wright for research assistance. I am particularly grateful to Keith Aoki, Richard Painter, and the University
of Oregon School of Law for inviting me to participate in this Conference on Innovation and the Information Environment. Unless otherwise noted, this Article attempts to reflect legal and technical developments up to February 1, 1996.
1 The FBI estimates that eighty percent of computer crime it investigates involves
the Internet. DAVID ICOVE
BOOK 129 (1995).

ET AL., COMPUTER CRIME: A CRIMEFIGHTER's HAND-

2 For an explanation of cryptographic techniques see infra Part I.A-C.
3 See generally A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography,
The Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709 (1995).
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are important to electronic commerce, and suggest that they are
likely to provoke some interesting legal problems. It does not
attempt to describe a complete legal regime for the regulation of
CAs in electronic commerce. 4 The coming wave of faceless electronic commerce presents a number of challenges; opportunities
for fraud and error and for the prevention of fraud and error are
interwoven with the solutions to these difficulties. Although accounts of fraud in commercial electronic transactions (as opposed to simple theft of data or services by a stranger) on the
Internet remain very rare, this may reflect the low level of Internet commerce today more than any virtues of the medium.5
Utah was the first state to attempt to provide a regulatory
framework for CAs. The Utah Digital Signature Act provides
for a safe harbor against most liability for those who qualify.6 No
one has qualified to date,7 and the Act does not define the duties
and liabilities of those who do not qualify for the safe harbor. 8
Clarification of the duties and liabilities of CAs in the absence of
legislation should thus serve the interests of all parties to an electronic transaction in which a certificate plays a role. Other states,
and perhaps some day the United States Congress, will eventu-

ally have to decide whether to enact digital signature laws of
4 Attempts to do this are in progress. The state of Utah passed a Digital Signature
Act in 1995, UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 46, ch. 3 (1995), and amended it in 1996. Digital
Signature Act Amendments, 52nd Leg., Gen. Sess., 1996 Utah Laws 188 (LEXIS,
Codes library, UTCODE file) (to be codified at UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 46, ch. 3)
(hereinafter all cites to the UTAH CODE ANN. incorporate the 1996 amendments).
As of November 1995, no certification authorities had qualified under the Utah Act.
See Introductory Commentary, History and Current Status of the Utah Act *1,
available online URL http://www.state.ut.us/ccjj/digsig/dsut-int.htm. The Information Security Committee of the Section on Science and Technology of the American
Bar Association issued the Draft Digital Signature Guidelines for public comment
which ended in January 1996. Draft Digital Signature Guidelines, available online
URL http://www.state.ut.us/ccjj/digsig/dsut-gl.htm [hereinafter Draft Guidelines].
The Guidelines are currently being revised. The state of California has passed a
statute delegating to the Secretary of State powers to make rules regulating the use
and verification of digital signatures. See 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 594 (A.B. 1577)
(West). On March 29, 1996, Washington State approved a digital signatures statute
with an effective date of January 1, 1998. See Washington Electronic Authentication
Act, 1996 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 250 (S.B. 6423) (WL, WA LEGIS Library).
5 "The Net currently is a universe of browsers rather than shoppers." Larry
Marion, Who's Guarding the Till at the CyberMall?, DATAMATION, Feb. 15, 1995, at
38, 41.
6 UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-309 (1996).
7 Introductory Commentary, History and Current Status of the Utah Act, supra
note 4, at *1.
8 UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-201(5).
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their own, and they may find it helpful to have a better understanding of the legal background against which a comprehensive
legislative program may be drawn.
Before embarking on a discussion of the role of trusted third
parties in electronic commerce, it is useful to review basic cryptographic techniques such as public-key cryptography and digital
signatures. Cryptographically sophisticated readers should skip
to Part I.D., which begins a description of certification authorities and discusses the various types of digital certificates they
may issue, or to Part II, where the discussion of the application of
these techniques to Internet commerce begins. In order to show
just how hard it can be to determine what legal rules apply to this
new world of electronic commerce, Part III offers an introductory discussion of the liability of a CA that issues an erroneous
certificate.
I
CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, DIGITAL SIGNATURES,
DIGITAL CERTIFICATES, AND THE PEOPLE

WHO ISSUE THEM

A.

Public-Key Cryptography

A public-key cryptosystem is one in which messages encrypted
with one key can only be decrypted with a second key, and viceversa. A strong public-key system is one in which possession of

both the algorithm and one key gives no useful information
about the other key and thus no clues as to how to decrypt the

message. 9 The system gets its name from the idea that the user
will publish one key, but keep the other one secret. The world
can use the public key to send messages that only the private key
owner can read; the private key can be used to send messages
that could only have been sent by the key owner.
With the aid of public-key cryptography it is possible to establish a secure line of communication with anyone who is using a
compatible decryption program or other device. Sender and receiver no longer need a secure way to agree on a shared key. If
Alice wishes to communicate with Bob, a stranger with whom
9 See BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY:

PROTOCOLS, ALGORITHMS

AND SOURCE CODE IN C 470-74, 501-02 (1996) (stating that security of public-key
systems depends on inability of factoring large numbers rapidly or on the continuing
inability of mathematicians to solve the long-standing problem of calculating discrete logarithms).
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she has never communicated before, Alice and Bob can exchange the plain text of their public keys. Then, Alice and Bob
can each encrypt their outgoing messages with the other's public
key and decrypt their received messages with their own secret,
private key. The security of the system evaporates if either
party's private key is compromised, that is, transmitted to anyone
else.
Thus, if Alice wants to send a secure e-mail message to Bob,
and they both use compatible public-key cryptographic software,
Alice and Bob can exchange public keys on an insecure line. If
Alice has Bob's public key and knows that it is really Bob's then
Alice can use it to ensure that only Bob, and no one pretending
to be Bob, can decode the message.
The problem facing Alice in this scenario, however, is that
there is no more reason to trust an e-mail message purporting to
be from Bob that says "here is my public key" than there is to
trust any other e-mail message purporting to be from Bob. Lacking independent confirmation, Alice has no way of knowing
whether the message is really from Bob or from an imposter.
(Bob has the same problem regarding Alice.) One bit looks exactly like another, making it possible for Mallet to forge
messages purporting to come from either Alice, Bob, or both. 10
And, if Mallet is able to masquerade as Bob in an e-mail
message, Mallet can just as easily send Alice his own public key,
claiming that it belongs to Bob. Without help from a source external to the Internet communication, either a trusted third party
or some "out-of-band" (non-Internet) communication that is reliable, Alice has no way of assuring herself of the authenticity of
any e-mailed communication from a stranger, regardless of what
it says. Alice needs some assurance to feel confident that she is
not sending the details of a tender or her financial details to a
malicious stranger who might seek to profit from it at her expense. Of course, if the message is from someone Alice already
knows, the message itself may provide internal clues of its authenticity-for example, the clichrd scenario in war movies in
which soldiers radio from behind enemy lines and identify themselves by telling their buddies about a well-remembered poker
hand.
A third-party registry of public keys does not really solve Alice's and Bob's problem unless the registry also certifies the accu10 This is the classic "man-in-the-middle" attack. Id. at 48-49.
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racy of the information it contains. Suppose that Carol runs an
Internet directory service that contains names, e-mail addresses,
and public keys. Being a generous person, Carol invites anyone
to sign up for free, and makes no effort to check the data submitted to her. Alice has no way of knowing whether the entry for
Bob was sent in by Bob, or whether it was sent in by Mallet
claiming to be Bob. If Mallet sent it in, he will have an entry with
Bob's name, Mallet's e-mail address, and Mallet's public key. A
directory service alone is thus of little value in providing the assurance as to Bob's identity that Alice wants."
The World Wide Web (Web) introduces some complications
into this picture but does not alter the basic substance. Although
at this writing it is very difficult for Alice to completely mask the
identity of the account accessing a Web page, prototype anonymous Web browsers are currently being developed.' 2 Even if Alice does not have access to an anonymous browser, there is no
way for Bob to know whether Alice is using an account that can
be traced to her, or an account procured under a pseudonym, or
a hacked account belonging to someone else entirely. Similarly,
in the ordinary course, Bob's Web address identifies his Web
page as residing on a particular machine whose physical location
can be deduced from information readily available on the Internet, 13 although the address itself is less informative than a telephone number. 4 However, some services sell anonymous Web
pages' 5 and Web addresses can be hacked; furthermore,
messages to and from a Web server also are at least theoretically
subject to a "man in the middle" attack by which message packets are intercepted and replaced with the attacker's messages.' 6

11 One method of addressing this problem is the "web-of-trust" approach. See
infra note 26.
12 Prototype anonymous Web proxies are in development. See, e.g., Anonymizer
FAQ, available online URL http://anonymizer.cs.cmu.edu:8080/faq.html.
13 For a more detailed description of these mechanisms see BRENDAN P. KEHOE,
ZEN AND THE ART OF INTERNET (1992), available online URL http://www.cs.indiana.edu/docproject/zen/zen-1.0_3.html.
14 For example, the organization that created www.trilateral.com is (almost certainly) not the real Trilateral Commission. See The Trilateral Commission, available
online URL http://www.trilateral.com (including humorous cites and links to "other
conspiracies").
15 See, e.g., Community ConneXion, The Internet Privacy Provider, availableonline URL http://www.c2.org/web.phtml.
16 See SC-NEIER, supra note 9, at 48-49.
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Digital Signatures

Public-key systems also allow users to append a digital signature to an unencrypted message. A digital signature encrypted
with a private key uniquely identifies the sender and connects the
sender to the exact message. When combined with a digital time
stamp 1 7 the message can also be proved to have been sent at a
certain time. Anyone who has the user's public key can then verify 8 the integrity of the signature. Because the signature uses
the original text as an input to the encryption algorithm, if the
message is altered in even the slightest way, the signature will not
decrypt properly, showing that the message was altered in transit
or that the signature was forged by copying it from a different
message. 9 A digital signature copied from one message has an
infinitesimal chance of successfully authenticating any other
message. 20
Again, however, the utility of a digital signature as an authenticating tool is limited by the ability of the recipient to ensure the
authenticity of the key used to verify the signature. If Alice uses

her private key to sign an otherwise unencrypted message, Bob
can verify that Alice really sent it only if Bob knows Alice's pub-

lic key. 2 ' In order to rely on the authenticity of that public key,
17 See infra Part I.D.4.
18 The Utah Digital Signature Law states that:
"Verify a digital signature" means, in relation to a given digital signature,
message, and public key, to determine accurately that:
(a) the digital signature was created by the private key corresponding to
the public key; and
(b) the message has not been altered since its digital signature was created.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-103(40).
19 Digital signatures achieve this by computing a hash value of the message and
then encrypting the hash value with the user's private key. See infra text following
note 59 (describing hash functions). The recipient checks the digital signature by
decrypting the hash value with the sender's public key, then comparing the hash
value with the hash value of the file received. If the two numbers are the same, the
file is authentic and unchanged. See Paul Fahn, RSA Laboratories, Answers to Frequently Asked Questions About Today's Cryptography § 2.13 (1993), available online URL http://www.rsa.com/pub/faq/faq.asc.
20 See SCHNEIER, supra note 9, at 38 (noting that a digital signature using a 160-bit
hash has only a one in 21" chance of misidentification).
21 Even if Bob does not know that the public key belongs to Alice, the key may
have value in identifying a series of messages as emanating from a single source
calling itself "Alice." This property is particularly valuable in establishing the continuity of a pseudonym in public forums, in preventing "nym collision" (in which two
or more parties accidentally use the same pseudonym), or "nym hijacking" (in which
Mallet sends messages signed "Alice" in order to free ride on the good reputation
"Alice" has accumulated among those familiar with her messages). See A. Michael
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however, Bob needs to get it from some source other than the
"Alice" sending the message, because if Mallet is forging a
message from Alice he will send his own public key as well,
claiming that it actually belongs to Alice. Since Mallet has the
private key corresponding to the public key he sends Bob, Bob's
attempt to verify the signature of the forged message will result
in a confirmation of the message's authenticity-even though it is
not really from Alice at all. In contrast, if Bob has access to Alice's real public key from some outside source, and uses it to verify the message signed with Mallet's private key, the verification
will fail, revealing the forgery.
In short, if Alice and Bob are strangers with no alternate
means of communication then no digital signatures, indeed no
amount of cryptography standing alone, will reliably authenticate
or identify them to each other without the assistance of some
outside source to provide a link between their identities and their
public keys. Any outside source that reasonably inspires trust
will suffice: for example, the telephone company might include
its public key in the monthly phone bill, or corporations might
publish their public keys in the newspaper. Or, the outside
source could be a trusted third party such as a mutual friend, a
government agency, or a business that offers on-line verification
services.
C.

Certification Authorities

A Certification Authority (CA) is a body, either public or private, that seeks to fill the need for trusted third party services in
electronic commerce by issuing digital certificates that attest to
some fact about the subject of the certificate.22
In order for either Bob or Alice to be willing to accept certificates issued by Carol, a CA, Bob and Alice must have confidence
that Carol's public key is really Carol's and not another manifestation of the wily Mallet. One way to achieve this confidence is
Froomkin, Flood Controlon the Information Ocean: Living With Anonymity, Digital
Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 Prrr. J.L. & COMMERCE (forthcoming 1996).
22 See generally WARWICK FORD, COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY: PRINCIPLES, STANDARD PROTOCOLS AND TECHNIQUES 93-101 (1994). The International

Telecommunications Union defines a CA as a body "trusted by one or more users to
create and assign certificates." MICHAEL S. BAUM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, FEDERAL CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY LIABILITY AND POLICY: LAW AND POLICY OF CERTIFICATEBASED PUBLIC KEY AND DIGITAL SIGNATURES 5 (1994) (quoting ITU-T, X.509

§ 3.3 (1993)).
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to have an identifying certificate from Trent, another CA, certifying Carol's key. CAs that certify other CAs are said to participate in a certificate chain, with a root certificate at the bottom of
the tree.23 Unfortunately, this just shifts the problem to the validity of Trent's CA's public key.
One solution to this problem contemplates a governmental
role in certifying the keys of CAs. The root key would belong to
a state or federal agency, and the few CAs that met state licensing requirements would be rewarded with government certification of their root key.24 These CAs would then certify the root
keys of organizations that wished to manage their own certificates. A CA might certify the root key of ABC Corp, which
would in turn be used to certify the keys of, for example, the key
manager in each corporate division, which in turn would certify
the keys of salespeople, purchasing agents and press secretaries.
The more levels there are in a certification tree, the more certificates Alice needs to check to ensure that Bob's certificate remains valid. Suppose that Bob's digital signature is supported by
a certificate issued by CA1, which has a public key certified by
CA2, in turn certified by CA3, which in turn is certified by a state
government. If the state government issues a notice of revocation for the certificate of CA3 because, for example, someone
has broken its private key, all certificates descending from CA3
are now suspect. If CA3 could say with certainty that its key
remained safe until a particular date, then certificates bearing a
secure timestamp showing that they were issued before that time
would still be reliable. 2 Alice can work all this out, but it takes
some computing time, and it may require accessing as many different databases as there are CAs which also could be costly or
26
time-consuming.
23 Warwick Ford, Advances in Public-Key Certificate Standards, SIG SECURITY,
AUDIT
& CONTROL REV., July 1995, at 9, 10.
24
See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-104, 46-3-201.
25 The time stamp from an outside source is essential. Alice cannot trust a certificate from CA3 that claims to have been issued during the safe period because the
party forging the certificate could be lying about the time as well. A certificate with
an outside timestamp proving that it was issued before CA3's key was compromised
can be revalidated by a new, trustworthy certificate from CA3 or any other CA,
thereby extending its lifespan considerably. See Dave Bayer et al., Improving the
Efficiency and Reliability of Digital Time-Stamping, in SEQUENCES II: METHODS IN
COMMUNICATION, SECURITY, AND COMPUTER SCIENCE 329, 332-33 (Renato
Capocelli et al. eds., 1993).

26 Certification authorities are not the only means by which strangers can be persuaded to trust each other. An alternate system, called the web-of-trust, blurs the
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The few CAs currently in operation have dealt with the absence of an agreed root certification authority by simply signing
their own keys and posting the self-certified key on their Web
sites. 27 The self-certified key is then mirrored on other computers. 28 This self-certification, in which the CA relies on its reputation gleaned from other business dealings, fits a model of
relatively flat certification hierarchies, in which users turn to
CAs, be they suppliers or the United States Postal Service, that
they already know in other contexts. One expert predicts that
distinction between CAs and users. Every participant in a web-of-trust system is
able to issue notices about whom they know and trust, and there is no central authority. In this system, Carol may provide a directory of e-mail addresses and public
keys (the key server), but if so, she makes no representations at all as to their ownership or authenticity. Users then provide authenticating statements for each other.
ypically this is done by meeting face-to-face and showing identification, and then
by exchanging public keys signed with their private keys. Alternately, users can
exchange "key fingerprints"-a short form of the key that points to the key's location on the key server. If Alice wishes to make it easy for people she has not met to
contact her securely, Alice must upload these authentications to the key server. If
Alice has her key signed by David, whom Bob knows or trusts, Bob can safely assume that the signature purporting to be from "Alice" is not in fact an impostor's.
Suppose, however, that Alice and Bob do not have any friends in common, but that
Bob's friend David has signed Ted's key, and Ted has signed Alice's key. From
Bob's point of view this is not as good as if David, whom he knows, had signed
Alice's key, but it is considerably better than nothing. Bob needs to decide how
many intermediaries he is willing to accept before he considers a public key to be
unreliable. The increase in the length of the chain of authentication can be offset by
finding multiple routes to Alice. For example, Bob may still feel reasonably secure
if he can establish three relatively long but independent chains of authentication.
See Philip Zimmermann, PGP TM User's Guide Volume I: Essential Topics (Oct. 11,
1994), available online URL ftp://net-dist.mit.edu/pub/PGP. This web-of-trust approach is the foundation of the PGP encryption system.
The web-of-trust model has the advantage of being independent of any central
authority. It has the disadvantage that it requires Alice either to trust strangers
when she has no friends in common with Bob or to accept that there are large numbers of people with whom she cannot securely communicate. In contrast, the CA
model is designed to make it possible for all strangers to communicate regardless of
whether they have any friends in common, and to define with some precision the
degree of trust that they can put in the CA's representations about strangers. This
Article discusses CA-based systems, but this is not intended to denigrate the utility
of a web-of-trust system. If it is true that all people are within six degrees of separation
from each other, the web-of-trust may be a valuable system.
27
See, e.g., The Sun CA's Certificate, available online URL http://www.incog.
com/self.html; Internet PCA Registration Authority Root Key Information, available online URL http://bs.mit.edu:8001/ipra.html; Netscape Test Certification Authority, available online URL http://home.netscape.com/newsref/ref/netscape-testca.html.
28 Mirroring makes Mallet's job more difficult; however, if Mallet is able to filter
all messages from Alice's computer to the rest of the world, no amount of mirroring
will defeat him.
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the wave of the future will be relatively flat hierarchies, in which
organizations have a root certificate for internal purposes that is
certified by at most one other CA.2 9 It is simply too early to
know which certification model will predominate, but it is interesting to consider that today the major indicator of the authenticity of most accountant's and lawyer's opinions provided to third
parties is the letterhead (easily forged) and the representation of
authenticity by the party proffering the opinion.
D. Certificates
A certificate is a digitally signed statement by a CA that provides independent confirmation of an attribute claimed by a person proffering a digital signature. More formally, a certificate is
a computer-based record which: (1) identifies the CA issuing it,
(2) names, identifies, or describes an attribute of the subscriber,
(3) contains the subscriber's public key, and (4) is digitally signed
30
by the CA issuing it.
As a formal matter, a certificate binding a fact to a public key
does not need to have a description of the level of inquiry used to
confirm the fact. Bob would be foolish, however, to trust a certificate that made no representation, if only through incorporation
by reference, as to the nature of the inquiry used. While a zeroinquiry certificate issued by "Certificates-R-Us" is, in some
sense, a real certificate, its attestational value is low.
In practice, CAs will probably offer a range of certificates,
graded according to the level of inquiry used to confirm the identity of the subject of the certificate. For example, VeriSign, a
company that has recently begun advertising its willingness to
provide identifying certificates 31 under the unfortunate name of
29 Warwick Ford, Looking into the Crystal Ball: Certificates Revisited, Presentation at the Worldwide Electronic Commerce Conference (Oct. 20, 1995).
30 See Ford, supra note 23, at 9. The Utah Act defines a "certificate" as a document that "names or identifies its subscriber." UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-103(3)(B).
Arguably, this could be read to limit the reach of the Act to identifying certificates.
Alternately, one could read the Act to say that any certificate that binds an attribute
of the subscriber to the subscriber's public key "identifies" the subscriber in some
manner. This seems the better reading since the Act clearly contemplates certifi-

cates other than identifying certificates, and even defines a "transactional certificate" as "a valid certificate incorporating by reference

one or more digital

signatures," UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-103(37), albeit stating a "transactional certificate is a valid certificate only in relation to the digital signature incorporated in it by
reference." UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-103(39)(B).

31 Identifying certificates are described infra Part I.D.1.
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"Internet driver licenses" for the information Superhighway,32
proposes four different classes of certificates which will be compatible with Netscape World Wide Web browsers. Class 1 certificates, designed for "casual Web browsing and secure e-mail use,"
certify only "the uniqueness of a name or e-mail address. '33 VeriSign will issue Class 1 certificates in response to an e-mailed request by the subject. 34 In contrast, VeriSign will only issue a
Class 2 certificate, which is more expensive, after receiving "third
party proofing of name, address and other personal information
provided in the on-line registration process. ' 35 To obtain a Class
3 certificate, the subject must pay still more money and appear in
person or present "registered credentials. 36 VeriSign also contemplates a bespoke certificate, Class 4, that would issue after
the subject is "thoroughly investigated."37
CAs are likely to issue several types of certificates, notably
identifying certificates, authorizing certificates, transactionalcertificates, and time stamps.
1.

Identifying Certificates

An identifying certificate, such as the ones being offered by
VeriSign, 38 connects (the technical term is "binds") a name to a
public key. The act of the CA in checking that the name corresponds to something in the nondigital world binds the name to an
identity. Careful and accurate identification is not a trivial task:
the cost of verifying the identities of all holders of U.S. Social
Security cards and reissuing the cards would exceed $1.5 billion.39 Of course, for digital communications, the "name" need
not necessarily be either a unique name or even a real name.
32 VeriSign, Class 1 Digital IDs, available online URL http:\\www.verisign.
com\netscape\classl.html. The name is unfortunate because it implies that an identifying certificate is, or should be, a prerequisite to Internet access.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 VeriSign,

Class 2 Digital IDs, available online URL http://www.verisign.coml
netscape/class2.html.
36 VeriSign, Class 3 Digital IDs, available online URL http://www.verisign.com/
netscape/class3.html.
37 VeriSign, Class 4 Digital IDs, available online URL http://www.verisign.com/
netscape/class4.html.
38 See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
39 Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 451,459
(1995) (citing Hearingon the Use of the Social Security Number as a National Identifier Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25 (1991) (statement of Gwendolyn S. King, Coin-
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The "name" could be "Darth Vader X" or "John Smith" or "John
Smith, 1000 Main Street, Eugene, Oregon, Social Security
Number 123-45-6789." In addition to being stored on computers
connected to the Internet, certificates could be stored on smart
cards, and could be used for issuing driver's licenses and public
benefits, or conducting banking and other transactions.
In order to issue a certificate stating that a particular public
key belongs to Alice, the CA generates an electronic message
containing Alice's name, a statement as to the type of inquiry
used to ascertain that the person purporting to be Alice is really
Alice, and her public key. The CA signs this message with its
private key. What happens next depends on the type of service
the CA offers. The CA might publish the resulting certificate on
a World Wide Web site available to anyone with Internet access,
or give the certificate to Alice, or contract with Alice to honor emailed requests for the certificate from all comers. In some
cases, these choices might affect the legal regime that applies to
the CA.4 °

Armed with an identifying certificate from a reputable CA, Alice is in a much better position to persuade Bob that the digital
signature she proffers really belongs to her and not to Mallet. If
the CA is a reputable entity, and if its digital signature on the
certificate can be verified, 41 Bob no longer has to trust Alice's
electronic word because he now has confirmation from an independent source. Bob's attempt to verify the CA's digital signature requires that he have access to some independent means of
ensuring that what purports to be the CA's public key is authentic, and not yet another scam by the cunning Mallet. Since the
CA is in the business of providing such assurances, perhaps for a
small fee, it may make economic sense for the CA to provide
customers such as Alice and Bob with the means to confirm the
authenticity of its public key, such as routine publication in a
newspaper. The CA might also establish the accuracy of its public key by reference to a special "root" certificate established
either by trade usage or by a government agency.
missioner of Social Security, estimating the cost of reissuing the cards from $1.5 to
$2.5 billion)).
40
See infra Part III.A.1.
41 Recall that "to verify" a digital signature is to confirm that the public key associated with the party whose name appears on the message properly produces a numerical result that uses the plaintext as an input to the algorithm. See supra notes
19-20 and accompanying text.

Trusted Third Parties in Electronic Commerce

Even a certificate that can be verified is not ironclad proof of
an identity. For example, Bob might foolishly have shared the
passphrase to his private key with a family member, who then
takes advantage of this disclosure to make transactions under
Bob's name. Bob's passphrase might have been carelessly chosen and cracked by Mallet. "Bob" might even be Mallet if the
CA were negligent, or if Mallet is so good at fooling CAs that
even the CA's reasonable care was insufficient to penetrate Mallet's deception.
The risks that the reality represented by the certificate is out of
date can be controlled, but not eliminated, by ensuring that certificates are dated when issued, stated to have limited periods of
validity or be subject to periodic reconfirmation by the CA, and
by having Alice check the certificate revocation list (CRL)42
maintained by the CA to warn recipients of certificates known to
be no longer reliable. The absence of either rules or usages of
trade determining who has a continuing duty to monitor the accuracy of data in certificate means that Alice has to make some
difficult decisions. In addition to routinely checking the right
CRL, Alice might decide that she will only accept certificates
that state that their date of issue was within thirty days. If Alice
is extremely cautious she can decide to accept only certificates
that are very recent, maybe less than a day old, or even limit
herself to certificates issued within minutes or microseconds. She
still bears some risk, but it is reduced.
As for the risk of receiving an erroneous certificate, Alice will
have to make a judgment as to which certificates from which CAs
she will accept. This decision is likely to be based on the CA's
reputation and on the representations that the CA makes about
the level of inquiry undertaken to issue a certificate. To return to
the VeriSign example, 3 Alice might decide not to accept "Class
1" certificates, but to require at least "Class 2." Or she might
decide that there was something about the limitations on liability
asserted by VeriSign that displeases her and so choose to refuse
all its certificates because she prefers a competitor's promises.
Whatever the level of inquiry promised by a CA, however, it is
always possible that the CA was negligent or that Mallet simply
outsmarted it. For Alice, these are the risks of the trade, much as
42

See Ford, supra note 23, at 10. For more on CRLs see infra notes 107-08 and
accompanying text.
43 See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
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merchants bear some risk of forged signatures and counterfeit
money in more mundane commerce.
2.

Authorizing Certificates

Although identifying certificates are likely to be the most popular type of certificate in the short run, in the medium term CAs
are likely to begin certifying attributes other than identity. An
authorizing certificate might state where the subject resides, the
subject's age, that the subject is a member in good standing of an
organization, that the subject is a registered user of a product, or
that the subject possesses a license such as bar membership.
These authorizing certificates have many potential applications.
For example, law professors exchanging exam questions on the
Internet could require that correspondents demonstrate their
membership in the Association of American Law Schools
(AALS) before being allowed to have a copy of the questions.
It is illegal to export high-grade cryptography from the United
States without advance permission from the federal government,44 but there are no legal restrictions on the distribution of
strong cryptography to resident aliens or United States citizens in
the United States. The lack of a reliable means to identify the
geographical location of a person from an Internet address creates a risk of prosecution for anyone making cryptographic
software available over the Internet. 45 For example, if Alice is
making high-grade cryptography available for distribution over
the Internet, she might protect herself from considerable risk by
requiring that Bob produce a valid 46 certificate from a reputable
CA, stating that he is a United States citizen or green card holder
residing in the United States, before allowing him to download
the cryptographic software.
44 See generally International Traffic in Arms Regulations, Pub. L. No. 90-629, 90
Stat. 744 (codified at 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130 (1995)) (ITAR). The ITAR are administered by the Office of Defense Trade Controls in the State Department. If the State
Department chooses, it can transfer jurisdiction of an export application to the Commerce Department. The statutory authority for the ITAR is the Arms Export Control Act (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1994)).
45 Whether such a prosecution could succeed is a question beyond the scope of
this Article. Since the instruction to download software is issued by the recipient's
computer, an argument can be made that the "export" is committed by the recipient,
not the owner of the software. In any case, the risks incident to being a test case are
substantial: up to a $1 million fine and ten years in jail. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (1994).
46 For a discussion of what "valid" means in this context see supra text following
note 42.
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Alice substantially reduces her risk under the ITAR by requiring Bob to produce an authorizing certificate demonstrating his
citizenship, but even this does not eliminate her risk. Alice's major remaining risks are that: (1) the CA's statement was erroneous; (2) Bob has lost control of his digital signature and it has
fallen into the hands of Mallet, who is not a United States citizen
or permanent resident, or is abroad; and (3) something about
Bob has changed since he procured the certificate, for example,
he has moved abroad, lost his citizenship or green card,7 or has
died and his private key is held by his executor or heir.1
A certificate binding the geographic location, age, or other attribute to a public key can contain the name of the subject of the
certificate, but the public key suffices if it was generated in a secure manner and is sufficiently long to be unique. Nameless,
anonymous certificates create the possibility for sophisticated
anonymous Internet commerce. For example, persons wishing to
purchase materials that can only be sold to adults might obtain
"hover 18" certificates that bind this attribute to a public key but
do not mention their name. 8 Similarly, a financial institution
might issue a certificate linking a public key to a numbered deposit account.
3.

Transactional Certificates

A third type of certificate, the transactional certificate, 49 attests to some fact about a transaction. 0 Unlike an identifying
certificate or an authorizing certificate, a transactional certificate
is not designed to be reused or to bind a fact to key. Instead, the
certificate attests that some fact or formality was witnessed by
the observer. For example, if Alice is a lawyer officiating at a
digital closing, and Bob is her client, Bob can digitally sign a doc47 Succession creates special problems for any system based on public-key cryptography. Any means Bob uses to create a backup copy of the pass-phrase to his
private key introduces a new risk to his security. On the other hand, robust social
protocols akin to those currently used in banking are needed to permit an executor
or heir to enter into transactions that have been designed to require Bob's digital
authorization.
48 For an example of an anonymous age credentialing service targeting persons
seeking access to "over 18" Web services, see Validate, available online URL http:l/
www.zynet.com/-validate/services.html.
49 Transactional certificates are sometimes referred to as attesting certificates or
notarial certificates.
50 The Draft ABA Digital Signature Guidelines define a "transactional certificate" as a "certificate for a specific transaction incorporating by reference one or
more digital signatures." ABA Draft Guidelines, supra note 4, § 1.30.
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ument. Alice then issues a certificate attesting that Bob digitally
signed it in her presence. The certificate might contain the text
of the document, 5 1 Bob's digital signature of the document, and
Bob's public key, all of which would be signed with Alice's private key. The resulting certificate would be evidence that Bob
affixed his signature in Alice's presence. 52 A transactional certificate of this type might suffice to transmit a deed to a public offi53
cial for recordation.
The differences between Alice's transactional certificate and
Alice's digitally signed confirmation that she received Bob's document are primarily legal rather than technical. Indeed, from a
cryptographic perspective, a transactional certificate is little more
than an ordinary electronic document digitally signed with the
CA's private key.
The potential legal differences are many and varied. First, the
act of affixing the signature likely will carry with it the type of
formality associated with a closing, or perhaps even with a notarial act in a civil law country. Indeed, the American Bar Association and the United States arm of the International Chamber of
Commerce are exploring the creation of an American legal specialization to be known as a CyberNotary®. 54 A CyberNotary
would be a lawyer able to demonstrate that she has the ability to
issue certificates from a trusted computing environment. The
hope is that civil law jurisdictions will come to accept a CyberNotary's certification as legally sufficient authentication and recordation of legal acts executed in the United States. If so, a power
of attorney or the transfer of corporate shares certified by a
CyberNotary in the United States would be recognized and enforced in those jurisdictions, even when an ordinary United
States lawyer's or United States notary's certification would not
51 Or, in some cases, a hash value, see infra text following note 59, and a pointer
to the actual document.
52 This example is drawn from the ABA Draft Guidelines, supra note 4, § 1.30.3.
53 See id.
54 In 1994, the Council of the ABA Section of Science and Technology resolved
that its Information Security Committee should work with the ABA Standing Committee on Specializations to draft a proposal for ABA accreditation of the CyberNotary as recognized legal specialization. ABA Section of Science and Technology
Section Minutes (Aug. 8, 1994) (copy on file with author). For updated information
on the CyberNotary project see Theodore Sedgwick Barassi, The CyberNotary:Public Key Registration and Certification and Authentication of International Legal
Transactions, available online URL http://www.intermarket.com/ecl/ cybrnote.html.
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suffice. 5
Second, a certificate will typically contain representations by
the CA as to the level of inquiry conducted by the CA, or will at
least incorporate a general policy statement by reference. In
contrast, an ordinary digital signature adds no content to the
message being signed.
Third, the CA may add link information to the document being signed, such as a secure timestamp from a trusted timestamping service.56
Fourth, by issuing a transactional certificate, a CA subjects
herself to a completely different, and arguably far more benign,
liability regime than does a CA who issues an identifying certificate. A transactional certificate is by nature a single-purpose
certificate. While an unlimited and unknowable number of third
parties may rely on it, the nature of their reasonable reliance is
largely, perhaps completely, within the control of the CA. A
lawyer who officiates at a closing, for example, might certify that
she examined corporate documents and that the corporate officers were duly authorized to enter into the transaction; this is
no different from what lawyers engaging in due diligence do today. It is, however, different from issuing an identity or
creditworthiness credential to a person who might then use it to
run up an unlimited amount of debt or other obligations.
4. Digital Time-Stamping Services
A time stamp is a cryptographically unforgeable digital attestation that a document was in existence at a particular time. It is
not difficult to show that a document existed after another event:
one need only include a reference to something that happened
earlier, which could not have been predicted before it happened.57 For example, before it became easy to doctor images,
kidnappers could demonstrate that their victim was still alive by
photographing him holding the front page of a newspaper.
Sometimes, it is enough to prove that a document was signed or
an event occurred after a given date, as in statute of limitations
questions. Often, however, it is equally (if not more) important
See Barassi, supra note 54.
56 See infra Part I.D.4.
57 Bayer et al., supra note 25, at 329. See generally Charles R. Merrill, The Digital
NotaryTm Record Authentication System-A Practical Guide for Legal Counsel on
Mitigation of Risk from Electronic Records (June 22, 1995) (footnote omitted from
title) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
55
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to show exactly when it happened, or to prove that it happened
before another date. If Alice quotes the headlines in last Tuesday's newspaper, it proves that she wrote the document no earlier than last Tuesday, but it gives Bob no way of telling whether
she wrote it on any of the days since then. The "creation date"
or "modification date" appended to documents by many word
processing systems is also of little or no evidentiary value since it
is a trivial matter to alter these dates, or to change the time on a
computer's internal clock.58 Alice's digital signature on the document tends to show that Alice wrote it and that no one else has
altered it, but the signature adds nothing to the credibility of Alice's claim as to when she wrote it.
The only way to prove beyond doubt that a document was created before a certain time is to "cause an event based on the
document, which can be observed by others."5 9 If Alice publishes the text of her document in the newspaper, she can prove
that it had to exist at the time it was published. This is expensive,
uses a lot of newsprint, and destroys Alice's privacy. A better
method is for Alice to publish a hash value of her document. A
hash value is a large number produced by a hash function that
takes the entire document as its input. The hash functions used
in this manner have three properties that allow them to serve as a
kind of fingerprint for a document. First, hash functions are public-anyone can repeat the calculation if he or she has the original document. Second, the hash function is a one-way function: if
Alice sends Bob a file purporting to be the document that produced a hash value she published in the newspaper five years
ago, Bob can easily confirm that the document's hash is the same,
but possession of the hash value alone does not allow anyone to
recreate the document. Third, although it is not impossible for
two different documents to produce the same hash value, the
odds against it are so high as to make this probability infinitesimal.60 Therefore, even a slight alteration to a document will
change its hash value, making it essentially impossible for Alice
to create a document with the same hash value as the one whose
hash value she published in the past. Even if Alice were to put
supercomputers to work to find another set of bits that produced
58

See, e.g., Rudolph J.Peritz, Computer Data and Reliability: A Call for Authentication of Business Records Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 80 Nw. U. L. REV.
956, 960 (1986).
59 Bayer et al., supra note 25, at 329.
60 See SCHNEIER, supra note 9, at 30-31.
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the same hash value as the original digital document, there is no
chance at all that this document would have letters and numbers
in an order that produced intelligible text.
Of course, for most transactions it is impractical to rely on
publication in a newspaper for authentication. This creates a
business opportunity for CAs. Carol, a CA, can provide a simple
time-stamping service by providing an attesting certificate that
Alice sent Carol a hash value of a document at a certain time.6 '
Carol might automate the process by having an Internet service
that returned a dated and digitally-signed certificate every time a
subscriber set her a hash value. Alice does not have to trust
Carol with her data, because all Carol ever sees is the hash value.
Now Bob no longer has to take Alice's word for when she wrote
the document; he only need believe that Carol is telling the truth
about Alice. If Carol is a reputable CA, her certificate may inspire this trust. If Bob is very mistrustful, however, he may be
concerned that the system would fall apart if Alice can persuade
Carol to backdate a time stamp.
A more secure method of time stamping documents exists. In
this system, Bob does not have to trust Carol because there is no
way for her to backdate a time stamp. Rather than simply signing the hash value of Alice's document, Carol sends Alice a digitally signed document reciting the hash values of Alice's
document, the hash values of the last few documents submitted
for time stamping and the e-mail addresses of their owners.
Now, the only way to forge a time stamp is to suborn both Carol
and many other users of the system. A weekly summary hash of
the "tree" of the many documents submitted is published in the
Sunday New York Times and is therefore unchangeable. 62 It is
currently being marketed by its inventors as the "Digital
NotaryTm."63

II
INTERNET COMMERCE: FRAUD'S PLAYGROUND?

Judging by the low amount of civil fraud (as opposed to crime)
to date, the Internet's reputation as fraud's playground is undeserved. Yet, this may be the rare case in which expectations ac61 See id. at 76.
62 See Bayer et al., supra note 25, at 331-32.
63 See Surety Technologies Homepage, available online URL http://www.surety.
com; SCHNEIER, supra note 9, at 78-79; Merrill, supra note 57.
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curately predict a possible future. While there may be a great
deal of Internet advertising and information exchange, there are
still relatively few transactions for value over the Internet. As
the amount of Internet commerce grows, the opportunities for
fraud may grow unless security and authentication measures also
grow.
The CA's role in identification and authentication is particularly important for transactions that have effects which extend
over time. In basic consumer transactions, where something is
exchanged for money, there may be no need for certificates-a
credit card suffices, with the issuer fulfilling the role of the third
party. If the goods are not forthcoming or if they are other than
they were represented to be, the customer can simply stop payment. If the goods are satisfactory, ordinarily the customer does
not care whether the seller was who she claimed to be.
The picture changes dramatically, however, as soon as the
transaction has lasting effects. If the communications are part of
an ongoing relationship such as instructions to a broker, or if the
terms of sale allow payments to be delayed, or if there is any
question of a warranty or service contract, the parties have a
much greater interest in identifying and authenticating each
other.
A.

Simple Sales

Although estimates vary, it is widely agreed that electronic
commerce over distributed networks, such as the Internet, is set
for explosive growth. One guesstimate suggests that approximately sixteen percent of consumer purchases may be electronic
transactions by the turn of the century, 6 a date now about five
years in the future. Definitions of electronic commerce differ;
this Article concentrates on commercial activities such as sales
and negotiations carried out over insecure distributed networks
such as the Internet.
Internet commerce presents challenges that are not present, or
are present in nearly harmless form, in traditional transactions
carried out face-to-face. These problems include:
Basic Transactional Issues
* How to move value.
64 Kelley Holland & Amy Cortese, E-Cash Could Transform the World's Financial
Life: Where E-Cash Will Take Off, Bus. WK., June 12, 1995, at 66, 70.
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* How to ensure that communications
eavesdroppers.
Merchant's Desires
*

AUTHENTICATION.

are secure from

Knowing the buyer's identity before mak-

ing the sale may assist in proof of order and guarantee of payment. The merchant also may wish to build up a database of
customers and their buying profiles.
"

The merchant may need proof that the

CERTIFICATION.

buyer possesses an attribute required to authorize the sale.
For example, some goods may only be sold to those licensed
to use them; other goods require that the purchaser be over
eighteen. Some products cannot be sold in some parts of the
country, others cannot be exported.
*

CONFIRMATION.

The merchant needs to be able to prove to

any third party involved in the transaction (such as a credit
card company) that the customer did indeed authorize the
payment.
*

NONREPUDIATION.

The merchant wants protection against

the customer's unjustified denial that he placed the order, or
that the goods were not delivered.
*

PAYMENT.

The merchant needs assurance that payment will

be made. This can be achieved by having payment before
sale, at time of sale, or by provision of a payment guarantee.
A credit reference by a trusted third party provides a lesser
form of assurance, but it at least demonstrates that the buyer
is capable of making the payment.
*

ANONYMITY.

In some cases, the merchant may want to con-

trol the amount of transactional information disclosed to the
customer.
Buyer's Desires
*

AUTHENTICATION.

Confirming the seller's identity prior to

purchase helps ensure that goods will be genuine, and that
service or warranties will be provided as advertised.

"

INTEGRITY.

*

Comfort that there is recourse if the seller fails
to perform or deliver.
CONFIRMATION. A receipt.
PRIVACY. Control over the amount of buyer/transactional information disclosed to third parties.

*
*

"

Protection against unauthorized payments.

RECOURSE.

ANONYMITY.

Control over the amount of transactional infor-
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mation disclosed to the merchant.6 5
Cryptographers would have us believe that most of the problems
on this list that arise from Internet commerce and are not present
in physical commerce can be solved, and the good news is that
this is largely correct. The bad news, unless you happen to be a
lawyer, is that the cryptographic solutions currently available are
not simply mathematical. They frequently rely on the intervention of a trusted third party who is a certificate-issuing CA. Issuing certificates entails the creation of new entities, new
businesses, and new relationships for which the duties and liabilities are currently uncertain.
The law of sales is complex, as the many sections of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) testify. Shifting any sale to an
electronic medium can add further complexity. To better understand the nature of the new problems posed by electronic commerce, and the ways in which they are reduced by the
introduction of a trusted third party, it helps to begin by considering this list of issues in the context of an extremely simple sale,
one which includes no documents of title, and in which both
goods and payment (or a promise to pay that functions as a close
substitute, for example, a check or credit card transaction) are
exchanged by face-to-face parties contemporaneously with the
moment of contract formation.
1.

Face-to-FaceSales

When Alice, a buyer, purchases food at the local grocery store
from Bob, the merchant, in a face-to-face sale, there is no problem with moving value: Alice tenders paper money and coin,'
food stamps or, if Bob permits it, Alice may choose to write a
check, pay with an ATM card, a debit card, a credit card, or even
in some cases buy "on account." Ordinarily, there is no particular need to ensure that the transaction is secure from Mallet, an
eavesdropper, since there is little that Mallet could do with the
information and even less that Mallet could do to hurt either Al65 This list is an adaptation and simplification of the more formal and extensive
list in Mihir Bellare et al., iKP-A Family of Secure Electronic Payment Protocols
(July 12, 1995), availableonline URL http://www.zurich.ibm.chfTechnology/Security/
publications/1995/ikp.ps.
66 Payment in paper money or coin may create a demand for change. Problems
may ensue if Bob lacks the correct change.
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ice or Bob.6 7 However, on the occasions when Alice and/or Bob

would desire privacy or anonymity, they might find these difficult
to obtain.
The documentation of the transaction differs slightly depending on whether it is a cash sale, or if there is a third party involved such as a bank or credit card company.' If there are just
two parties, Alice and Bob typically keep copies of a receipt. If
there is a third party, additional documents are generated, such
as a check, an electronic ledger entry and a paper receipt in the
case of an ATM card, or a credit card slip. 69 These pieces of
paper also serve as proof of order in the unlikely event that it is
questioned. Similarly, each of these payment mechanisms has
well-developed ways of ensuring that consumers are protected
from unauthorized payments. 70 On the other hand, buyer repudiation and nonpayment are issues in face-to-face commerce. A
cash payment cannot easily be repudiated, but it may be counterfeit. A check can be dishonored by the bank, and under United
States law, embodied in Regulation E, Alice has the right to contest a credit card payment up to two months later.7 '
Because physical goods are exchanged in a physical place, Alice has a number of indicators that suggest, although they do not
prove, that she will have recourse in the event that the purchase
is not satisfactory. First, Alice knows where the store is: its physical presence suggests that Bob may have assets that can be at67 If Alice is careless, Mallet might be able to obtain Alice's credit card receipt,
obtain her credit card number, and use it to run up charges on her credit card.
68 The discussion in the text greatly simplifies reality to underline the differences
between face-to-face commerce and electronic commerce. In the ordinary check
sale, there may well be multiple banks, since at a minimum, the check is likely to be
drawn on one bank, deposited to a second and cleared by a third. Similarly, some
credit card transactions involve multiple parties.
69 There is a significant difference between "on-line" clearance, in which Bob
checks that the credit/debit card has sufficient credit/funds before authorizing the
purchase, and "off-line" clearance, in which the purchase is not recorded with the
cr-edit card company until after the fact. In either case, transaction recording and
customer profiling is possible if an electronic payment mechanism is used.
70 For example, Alice's cash cannot be paid out unless it is stolen; checks cannot
be drawn unless Alice's signature is forged, and even then the bank may have a duty
to refuse payment. The holder of a credit card or debit card is only liable for the
first fifty dollars fraudulently charged to the card. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1)(B) (1994);
12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b) (1995) (limiting consumer liability to $50 for most unauthorized
electronic funds transfers).
71 See 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b)(2)(ii).
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tached, even if only a lease and the contents of the shop.72 The
accessibility of the store's physical location also makes it easier
for an irate customer to create bad publicity, either in the store
itself or in the store's community, further creating an incentive
for Bob to resolve any difficulty.73 Furthermore, knowing the location of the store gives Alice an indication of the legal system
that is likely to have jurisdiction over any conflict.
The physicality of the transaction also protects Bob. If authorization is required, Bob can demand that appropriate documents
be displayed (for example, proof of age, unless Alice's appearance seems sufficient proof) and he can examine the credentials
for authenticity. Bob also has some protection in the event that
the transaction goes badly. Seeing Alice offers some chance of
providing a description (or a store camera video) in the event of
nonpayment or fraud. The face-to-face aspect of the relationship
means that in many cases,'7 Alice will have to return the goods to
claim reimbursement. Thus, typically Alice will be unable to
continue to enjoy the products after claiming a refund.
2.

Telephone Sales
Telephone sales lack the face-to-face aspect of a sale in a store.
As a result, the parties are likely to have less knowledge about
each other. In addition, telephone sales, like catalog sales, introduce a time lag between the order and its fulfillment, during
which many things can go wrong: the goods may be discovered to
be different from what the buyer had imagined they would be,
the goods may spoil or be damaged in transit, either
party may
75
change its mind or become insolvent, and so on.
The party who placed the call obviously knows the number she
dialed, although if Alice calls Bob via an 800 number, that telephone number alone reveals little or nothing about Bob's location. 76 The recipient of the call may also know the calling party's
number if caller ID is available. Indeed, calls to an 800 number
72 The shop suggests, but does not prove, that Bob has attachable assets, since
these assets may be encumbered by liens and mortgages with priority.
73 Other than bad publicity, most jurisdictions limit Alice's self-help remedies in
the event of a dispute.
74 Consumables, perishables, and easily-copied materials excepted.
75 The UCC supplies a large variety of techniques that address each of these
problems, and more. See generally RICHARD E. SPEIDEL ET AL., SALES AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS 452-60 (1993).
76 Indeed, some firms, notably airlines, commonly switch calls from 800 numbers
to operators located abroad. Catherine Cleary, Telemarketing Harnesses Technology
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automatically disclose the number of the calling party.77 If Bob
uses a database indexing telephone numbers to addresses, credit
histories, or buying patterns, he may have considerable information about Alice regardless of who places the call. On the other
hand, if Alice is an ordinary consumer, her information about
Bob will depend largely on sources extrinsic to the call (for example, catalogs, advertising, prior dealings) and the firm's reputation, if any. In addition, returning goods or getting redress may
be more difficult with a faraway party. Not only may the relevant legal system be inaccessible or expensive to access, but Alice's inability to bring her complaint to the attention of other
shoppers reduces her bargaining power with Bob.
Although impersonation is certainly possible at the grocery
store, 78 it is easier over the telephone. Lacking the ability to verify signatures or identify the physical characteristics of the buyer,
Bob runs an increased risk of making sales to persons using stolen credit card numbers (although this risk is attenuated by using
on-line clearing). Similarly, because it is difficult to verify identity over the telephone, Alice runs an increased risk that the person claiming to be Bob is actually Mallet.
Although value cannot be exchanged by cash or check at the
time of sale, mailed payment can be a prerequisite to shipment.
As a practical matter, consumer telephone sales tend to be made
by debit or credit card because this medium of payment gives the
merchant considerable assurance of Alice's ability to pay, but not
necessarily a guarantee that payment will actually be made. The
credit card company's inability to ensure nonrepudiation 79 becomes a positive advantage, because Alice can transact knowing
that payment can be suspended if Bob, or the person claiming to
be Bob, fails to perform in some material way. Similarly, the
ability to repudiate transactions means that while the call may be
subject to eavesdropping or diversion, these acts are of limited
value to a third party so long as Alice checks her credit card bill

and Blarney, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 29, 1995, at sec. 3, supp. 7 (LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws file).
77

See Edmund L. Andrews, New Rules Are Approved for Nationwide Caller ID,

N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1995, at D5.

78 As the volume of trademark infringement suits demonstrates, goods as well as
people can be inauthentic.
79 See supra note 71.
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carefully for unauthorized purchases.80
3.

Internet Sales

Internet sales are likely to take two general forms: ordinary
commerce in tangible things and information commerce.
Ordinary commerce in tangible things will greatly resemble
common transactions today: purchases that are currently carried
out by telephone, ordinary mail (for example, catalog sales) and
even in person. Ordinary rules of commercial law presumably
will continue to apply to these transactions, subject to one vital
difference: without taking some special measures to identify each
other, the parties will be saddled with a risk that their counterpart will not be who she professes to be. Transactions that use a
telephone require that someone dial a telephone number. The
use of that telephone number implicates a record that ultimately
could identify the party called. In some cases, the number alone
will provide the identification; in other cases, it may be necessary
to invoke the aid of the legal process, or of the telephone company. Nevertheless, the telephone number provides some kind
of link to a physical presence, for at least one of the two parties
to the communication. 8 ' An Internet e-mail address, by contrast,
gives the recipient no reliable information about the person
sending the message.
Information commerce is more of a departure from traditional
sales. It has the immediacy of a face-to-face transaction, but little
mutual identifying information need necessarily be exchanged.
In information commerce, unlike ordinary commerce in tangible
things, there may be no package to help identify the sender after
the goods are delivered. Instead, both parties will conduct the
exchange electronically: the buyer will send digital cash and the
seller will send information.' Some of these transactions may be
sizable, such as the sale of access to proprietary databases or the
purchase of computer software, but others are likely to be very
small. For example, providers of information on the World Wide
Web might choose to charge a fraction of a penny to each person
80 Typically, merchants do not receive payment from a credit card sale until the
repudiation period has passed.
81 The call record may also identify the caller, but this is less certain. The caller
could place the call from a pay phone.
82 Whether the exchange is performed simultaneously or in series is up to the
parties.
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accessing their pages.8 3 Browsers may be configured to pay these
charges, up to a predefined limit, without ever troubling the user.
Existing credit card systems are too expensive for such
microcharges.
Microcommerce in information will require a
digital payment system that does not rely on the (expensive) participation of a third party such as a credit bureau or credit card
issuer.8 5 If such a payment system could be widely deployed, the
potential for growth of Internet information commerce is
enormous.
Identifying or authenticating certificates can provide all the information that a party might reasonably want for both information commerce and ordinary commerce in tangible things.
Whether it makes sense to require a certificate at all depends on
the amount of the transaction, the mode of payment, and the cost
and delay associated with use of a certificate. Of course, even
when it makes sense to use a certificate to verify identifying information about a transactional counterpart, this serves only to
restore the parties to an informational position akin to what is
commonplace in other more familiar transactions. It does not in
any way reduce the need for the existing, and complex, rules
about consideration, delivery, breach, title, security interests,
fraud, or any of the myriad other things addressed by the UCC
and other commercial and criminal law.
a.

TransactionalIssues: Moving Value and Authentication

If Alice has no hardware available to her other than her computer,' she can choose to move value to Bob across the Internet
83 See Arnold Kling, Banking on the Internet, available online URL http://wwwe lc.gnn.com/gnn/meta/finance/feat/archives.focus/ bank.body.html.
84
See, e.g., Electronic Cash, Tokens and Payments in the National Information
Infrastructure § 1.1, available online URL http://www.cnri.reston.va.us:3000/XIWT/
documents/ dig.cashdoc/ElecCash.html. The average U.S. credit card purchase today is $60. Id.
85 Steve Glassman et al., The Millicent Protocolfor Inexpensive Electronic Commerce, availableonline URL http:// www.research.digital.com/SRC/millicent/papers/
millicent-w3c4/millicent.html, argues that even digital coins are too expensive for
microtransactions, and that a new form of "scrip" needs to be deployed for microtransactions. Proposals for two schemes that may meet the exacting requirements of
efficient micro-transactions can be found in Ronald L. Rivest & Adi Shamir,
Payword and MicroMint. Two Simple Micropayment Schemes (Apr. 3, 1996), available online URL http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/-rivest/RivestShamir-mpay.ps.
86 Smart cards, sometimes called electronic wallets, also can be configured to be
stores of value. Rather than digital cash embodied in "coins" that are a series of
numbers in a cryptographic envelope, an electronic wallet contains a counter that
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(i) Debit Cards and Credit Cards
Today, the simplest way for Alice to pay Bob across the Internet is to use a debit card or credit card. This payment mechanism has the great virtue of familiarity. It uses established
mechanisms to apportion risk of nonpayment and repudiation.
Although it is vulnerable to eavesdropping, the risk may be
smaller than commonly believed.
If Alice sends out unencrypted credit card information on the
Internet she takes a chance that a third party will intercept the
information. To date, however, there are no reported cases of
credit card information acquired by eavesdropping on an Internet transaction being used to make a purchase.88 When one
considers that the same credit card information is easily available
to every employee of every merchant who accepts credit and
debit cards, and can be acquired by examining paper credit card
slips retained by any restaurant or dumped in the trash at any
mall, it is easy to see why few people go to the considerably
greater trouble of attempting to obtain credit card numbers by
monitoring large volumes of Internet traffic.
If Alice wants greater security, she can encrypt her credit card
data before sending it. Similarly, Bob may want assurances that
Alice is who she purports to be. Bob may want Alice to send her
order encrypted with her private key, thus uniquely identifying
the order as emanating from her. For a greater level of security,
Alice and Bob may require that identifying certificates from a
records the amount of money held on the card. Movement of value on and off that
counter can be hedged with a number of cryptographic safeguards. For example,
cards can be programmed to only accept value from cards that properly identify
themselves. Smart cards can be used to transfer value across the Internet if both
parties to the transaction have smart cards or the equivalent, and both have computers outfitted with appropriate card readers. For a taxonomy of smart card types
see David Chaum, PrepaidSmart Card Techniques: A Brief Introduction and Comparison, available online URL http://ganges.cs.tcd.ie:80/mepeirce/Project/Chaum/

cardcom.html.
87 One can also imagine other, less practical, systems, including barter transactions, by which Alice and Bob exchange services or digitizable products (software,
poems).
88 In contrast, in one incident, credit card information belonging to more than
20,000 customers that had been stored in an insecure database was compromised.
See JONATHAN LITTMAN, THE FUGITivE GAME 325, 348 (1996) (reporting apparent
copying of credit card records by Kevin Mitnick).
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reputable CA accompany the exchange of public keys.89 On the
other hand, since the debit/credit card issuer/administrator fulfills
some of the functions of a trusted third party already, and
charges the same commission regardless of whether Alice and
Bob exchange certificates, they may decide to take the risk. 9
Although debit and credit cards are the easiest means of transferring value over the Internet, and require little if any legal innovation, they have some disadvantages as well. Neither debit
nor credit cards are suited to small transactions because verification and clearing impose significant fixed costs on every transaction.91 Because one of the most likely applications of Internet
sales is microcharges-pennies or fractions of a penny-for the
right to view information such as a World Wide Web page, this
inability to handle tiny transactions strongly suggests the need
for an alternate payments mechanism. Furthermore, the utility
of credit and debit cards is critically dependent on the continuing
applicability of the consumer's liability being capped at fifty dollars in the event that a credit card number is copied in transit or
misused by the recipient. Without the fifty dollar limit, Alice
would face an enormous danger of her credit card information
going awry, either because Mallet managed to penetrate Bob's
security and copy all messages as they were sent to Bob's store,
or because Mallet fooled Alice into sending him the credit card
information by pretending to be Bob, or because Bob was careless and Mallet hacked his database. Any change in this regulatory regime would cause Alice, and indeed all consumers
contemplating electronic transactions, to need both encryption
and authentication.'
89 Alternately, Alice and Bob may find each other's public keys on a keyserver
that is part of the National Information Infrastructure; the keyserver may itself demand a valid certificate as a condition of the listing, or it may contain (optional?)
pointers to the databases where the certificates reside.
90 The risk is not negligible; the consumer risks a fifty dollar charge, 12 C.F.R.
§ 205.6(b), and considerable hassle, plus potential damage to a credit rating. The
merchant takes the risk of nonpayment since the credit card company will not pay
the merchant if the customer fails to pay.
91 See, e.g., Stefan Brands, Centrum voor Wiskunde en Informatica (CWI), Offline Electronic Cash Based on Secret-Key Certificates 1-2 (Report CS-R9506 1995),
available online URL ftp://ftp.cwi.nl/pub/brands/CS-R9506.ps.Z.
92 Whether Regulation E should apply to electronic money has been a matter of
some debate in Congress. See, e.g., Bill's EFTA and Reg E Exemptions Need Reworking, Blinder Tells Panel, BNA BANKING DAILY, Oct. 12, 1995, at *2 (LEXIS,
News library, Curnws file). ("Blinder said that he could support an extensive, and
perhaps blanket exemption from Reg E for stored-value cards of $20, but that there
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(ii) Electronic Cash
Electronic cash implementations vary. 93 While generalizations
are hazardous, most true digital cash systems that are entirely
software-based (for example, do not rely on a smart card or other
physical token to provide authentication or to store value) use
some variation of the "digital coin." A digital coin is a sequence
of bits, perhaps signed with an issuing financial institution's private key, that represents a claim of value.9 4
Software-based digital coins are potentially suitable for small
transactions, such as charging a penny or less to view a web page,
where credit cards would be prohibitively expensive. 95 Unfortunately, since bits are easy to copy, digital coin schemes require
fairly elaborate mechanisms to prevent a coin from being spent
more than once. One method of preventing double spending is
to require that coins be cleared in real time. If Alice offers a coin
to Bob, Bob immediately accesses the issuing bank to make sure
that the coin is valid and has not previously been spent.96 A necessary consequence of this protocol is that if Alice uses a digital
coin to pay Bob, Bob cannot spend it directly. Instead, Bob must
either deposit the coin in an account at the issuer or turn it in for
another digital coin or conventional money.97 An on-line clearing system can be configured to ensure that the bank does not
know who gave Bob the coin (payor anonymity), but the bank
will know that Bob received the coin (no payee anonymity).
While Bob might clear large payments from a single source on
line by making a real-time connection to the bank to ensure that
are questions about whether such an exemption is appropriate for large amounts
transferred over computer networks.").
93 See, e.g., PETER WAYNER, DIGITAL CASH: COMMERCE ON THE NET (1996)

(surveying a large number of existing and proposed systems); Froomkin, supra note
21, at Part III.E.2 (surveying fewer systems in more detail).
94
See generally Froomkin, supra note 21, at Part III.B.
95 Charging and payment might be built into the browser. Alice might program
her browser to pay any fee up to a set amount, say two cents, without asking for
confirmation. Glassman argues that even digital coins are too expensive for microtransactions, and that a new form of "scrip" needs to be deployed for micro-transactions. See Glassman et al., supra note 85.
96 One United States financial institution currently offers a "DigiCash" implementation with real money. See Mark Twain Banks, Providing Global Investment Solution, available online URL http//www.marktwain.com.
97 See David Chaum, Achieving Electronic Privacy, Sci. AM., Aug. 1992, at *1-2,
available online URL http://ganges.cs.tcd.ie/mepeirce/Project/Chaum/sciem.html
(discussing electronic cash); Ecash Homepage, available online URL http://
www.digicash.com/ecash/ecash-home.html.
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the coins have not previously been spent, this may be impractical
and uneconomic for transactions measured in pennies or less. Instead, Bob will accumulate a hoard of small digital coins and
send them to the bank to clear in batch lots. This off-line clearing opens a window of opportunity for unscrupulous parties to
engage in multiple spending. In order to forestall this, a bank
issuing coins that will be redeemed off-line is likely to require
that Alice encode some identifying information about herself
onto the coin. The system can be set up so that no one, not even
the bank, can read this information so long as Alice spends the
coin only once. A second attempt to spend the coin will disclose
Alice's identity and allow the issuer to sue her for fraud and perhaps report her to the authorities for criminal charges of fraud or
theft.98 Barring a complex money-laundering protocol,' Bob
cannot respend this type of coin either, and must turn it into the
bank just as if it had been cleared on-line. 1°°
This feature reduces the need for Alice and Bob to exchange
certificates; in essence, the digital coin carries its own certification. If Bob is particularly concerned about the possibility of
double spending, or if the percentage of respent coins being tendered to Bob reaches unacceptable levels, Bob may choose to
restrict even his microsales to parties that can provide an identifying certificate. Bob's decision will turn in part on the cost and
delay associated with a certificate as opposed to the cost and delay of having the bank help him trace double spenders.
b.

Confirmation Issues: Proof of Order, Nonrepudiation,
Receipt, and Recourse

All that Alice needs in order to prove that Bob made a promise to buy or to pay is a message including the promise signed
with Bob's digital signature. 10 1 The issue of proving the promise
is separate from whether a digital signature is a "signature" for
98 If the coins are cleared off-line, and the double-spender has received value from
the payee, then there is clearly theft from the payee. Whether the double spender
can be charged with attempted theft from the bank may depend on whether the
relevant jurisdiction allows prosection for attempted "impossible" crimes. Since in
most protocols the bank checks the validity of every coin before exchanging it for
value, there was no possibility that it would actually suffer a loss; the offense against
the bank is thus "impossible," and in some jurisdictions arguably noncriminal.
99 See infra text accompanying notes 102-04.
100 See Froomkin, supra note 21, at part III.B.3.
101 Electronic writings ordinarily satisfy the Statute of Frauds. See John R.
Thomas, Note, Legal Responses to Commercial TransactionsEmploying Novel Com-
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legal rules that require that a writing bear a signature. 10 2 Alice
will find it less cumbersome to prove Bob's promise if she has
access to a certificate, valid at the time of Bob's promise, that
links Bob to the signature appearing on the message. However,
a certificate may not be strictly necessary depending on the payment mechanism and the nature of the transaction.
Debit and credit cards leave an information trail that can assist
Alice in finding Bob, and vice versa. Because a payor might have
an anonymous or pseudonymous debit/credit card, 0 3 or because
a payee might have disappeared in the time since the transaction
was recorded, the trail is not perfect. However, the trail of information is significant, and not much different from what would
likely be in a certificate, so it is likely to make the certificate
somewhat redundant.
Digital cash can be designed to protect the anonymity of the
payor who does not double spend. A prudent payee who is tendered digital cash with this anonymizing feature may seek an
identifying certificate from the payor if the transaction makes it
important to know her. As most digital cash schemes do not protect the anonymity of the payee, the payor will request an identifying certificate only if the cost of the certificate is less than the
expected value of the cost of persuading the bank to release the
payee's identity on an occasion where this might be needed, adjusted for the danger that the payee will get away before being
identified. The cheaper and quicker it is to use a certificate, the
more likely it will be used.
The introduction of a coin laundry service that offered payees
an opportunity to exchange coins anonymously would greatly increase the payor's need for a certificate from the payee. A coin
laundry would break the guaranteed link between the identity of
the payee and the coin, whether or not Bob actually avails himself of the service. If Alice knows that Carol's coin exchange is in
business, Alice will have to be more wary about sending coins to
Bob, a stranger. Now, if Bob takes the coin and defaults on the
munications Media, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1145 (1992); Merrill, supra note 57, at 3. A
digital time stamp may add evidentiary value. Id. at 1.
102 Whether a digital signature is a "signature" is beyond the scope of this article.
See generally BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE § 16 (2d
ed. 1995).
103 For a description of how to obtain an anonymous credit card, see, e.g.,
Vaxbuster, Safe and Easy Charging, 4 PHRACK Issue 44, File 20, available online
URL http://www.fc.net:80/phrack/files/p44/p44-20.html.
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transaction, it is no longer obvious that the bank will be able to
identify Bob when Alice asks it to reveal who redeemed her coin.
If the bank tells her that the coin was redeemed by Carol's
money changing service, and Carol's service is located in a for104
eign jurisdiction, perhaps one with strong bank secrecy laws, '
Alice may find it very difficult to find out who Bob really is and
where he lives. In these circumstances, Alice may find that she
wants an identifying certificate from Bob after all. 1" 5
Consumers will have an increasing need for anonymous commerce as merchants become more adept at assembling computerized databases on their customers, and as these databases
themselves become valuable commodities.1 °6 Anonymous certificates are likely to play an essential role in anonymous commerce
since they will help induce parties to trade with one another
when they are unable to identify each other.
B.

Ongoing Transactions

As we have seen, there is a somewhat reduced need for a CA's
services when payment and goods are exchanged simultaneously,
although the need for a trusted third party is not eliminated. In
part this is because the payment schemes already incorporate a
trusted third party-the credit card company or the digital cash
issuer-who is likely to be capable, if pushed, of providing some
identification of the defaulting party in the event the transaction
goes badly.
In contrast, any communication in which the exchange of funds
and goods is not immediate, or which looks either backwards or
forwards in time, creates a strong and continuing need for authentication and/or identification. For example, if Alice has an
account with a broker, Bob, both Bob and Alice have a strong
interest in ensuring that any buy or sell order regarding Alice's
account be from Alice and no one else, and that this fact be easily provable should it ever be called into question. Similarly, par104 Banks are increasingly unwilling to provide truly anonymous bank accounts.
See, e.g., William W. Park, Anonymous Bank Accounts: Narco-Dollars, Fiscal
Fraud,and Lawyers, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 652, 668-69 (1991-92). Governments
are increasingly unwilling to allow banks based within their regulatory reach to offer
this service, in part because of the Council of Europe Money Laundering Convention whose reach extends beyond Europe. See EuroWatch, Banking Secrecy: Liechtenstein Signs European Money Laundering Convention (July 28, 1995) (LEXIS
News library, Curnws file).
105 1 am greatly indebted to Hal Finney for alerting me to this scenario.
106 See Froomkin, supra note 21, at part IV.
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ties negotiating on the Internet will want to ensure that they
know who they are communicating with in order to keep secrets
from their rivals. No supplier will wish to accept orders for goods
that are sold on terms that allow payment at a future date, even
from a regular customer, without assurances that the key used to
sign the order is one belonging to a person authorized to place
the order.
It is important to recall that, much like in the nonelectronic
world, the authentication/identification problem in these circumstances has two parts. Bob wants a certificate showing that Alice
is who she says she is and/or that Alice is authorized to do what
she wants to do. In addition, Bob needs an assurance that the
certificate issued to Alice remains valid. Alice could have left
her job as purchasing agent or she could have discovered that
someone has learned her passwords. In the nonelectronic world,
customers frequently take these things on faith; in the electronic
world, such faith is less reasonable and thus likely to be less
frequent.
In order, therefore, to be willing to rely on a certificate issued
to Alice for transactions of any value, Bob needs easy access to a
CRL 10 7 that will allow him to establish that Alice's certificate has
not been revoked or suspended. When Alice shows Bob her certificate (or when Bob contacts Carol to get a copy of Alice's certificate) Bob-or Bob's software-will check to see whether the
certificate has been revoked, 108 much like credit cards are
checked against lists of suspended cards today. Bob thus needs
an easy way to identify and get access to the CRL that would list
Alice's certificate if there were something wrong with it. And
every CA needs an efficient and reliable means of communicating its CRL to potential users of certificates.
Fortunately, the means for achieving these ends are now at
hand. The recognized standard for certificates is the X.509 standard maintained by the International Telecommunications Union

107

See supra text accompanying note 42 (describing the Certificate Revocation

List).
108 A certificate also might be suspended for a brief period, pending inquiries as
to whether it should be revoked. A prudent CA that received an emergency telephone call asking that a certificate be revoked might suspend it while waiting for
proof that the person making the request had the authority to do so. Cf. UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-306, -307 (providing for suspension of a certificate).
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(ITU). 109 Previous editions of this standard defined a relatively

rigid and inflexible form for a certificate, one that was not wellsuited to the legal requirements of digital commerce. In particular, neither the original X.509 standard, nor the revision known
as X.509 (ver 2) made provisions for a certificate to carry information about the CRL. Instead, the original X.509 standard provided information about how to contact the CA, and the user was
expected to be able to use this information either to identify the
CRL or to contact the CA for more information. 110 A recent
change in the X.509 standard, now known as X.509 (ver 3), solves
these problems. The new standard defines a data location where
a CA can put information that will allow Bob to find the CRL
quickly, such as the Internet address (URL) of the applicable
CRL.111 The new standard, which is being mirrored in standards
developed by ANSI X9 (which adopts standards for banks) and
ISO/IEC, also includes a data field in which a CA can insert information about how to find the policies that apply to the certifi12
cate, such as the level of inquiry undertaken before issuance.
III
THE DIFFICULTY OF IDENTIFYING THE RIGHTS AND
DUTIES OF PRIVATE CERTIFICATION
AUTHORITIES

As electronic commerce grows, it will become increasingly important to define the rights and duties of CAs. This will not be
an easy task, particularly once electronic commerce becomes
more international. International transactions intensify the
problems caused by the divergences between legal systems and
tend to raise the stakes in choice of law.113 "The consumer cannot and indeed will not participate effectively in the . . . market
where economic and legal conditions are obscure."' 1 4 Although
109 Ford, supra note 23, at 9. The ITU was formerly known as the Consultative
Committee
on International Telephony and Telegraphy (CCITT).
110
Id.at 10, 11.
111 Id. at 12-14.
112 Id. at 13.

113 Peter Sutherland, The Internal Market After 1992: Meeting the Challenge, Report to the EEC Commission by the High Level Group on the Operation of Internal
Market (1992), identified consumer uncertainty as a major impediment to the realization of a single European market.
114 Stephen Weatherill, The Role of the Informed Consumer in European Community Law and Policy, 2 CONSUMER L.J. 49, 59 (1994).
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international issues are beyond the scope of this Article, 15 identifying and applying the relevant substantive law can be a moderately complex problem even
when the focus is restricted to one
1 16
state in the United States.
The duties and potential liabilities imposed on private' 1 7 CAs
by United States law are unclear, as might be expected from the
dearth of applicable legislation, 118 the complete absence of case
law, and the very small number of currently functioning CAs.
Legislation attempts to provide clarity: the Utah Digital Signature Act provides for a safe harbor against most liability for
those CAs who qualify. No CAs have qualified to date, and the
Act in any event does not define the duties and liabilities of CAs
who do not qualify for the safe harbor. 1 9 Clarification of the
duties and liabilities of these CAs in the absence of legislation
should thus serve the interests of all parties to an electronic
transaction in which a certificate plays a role. As other legislatures debate whether to enact digital signature laws of their own,
they may find it helpful to have a better understanding of the
legal background against which they are working. This Part
seeks to begin a discussion of that background by addressing a
sample problem: who, under existing law, is liable for an erroneous certificate.
The importance of clarifying a CA's liabilities will grow further
if one aspect of the recently passed Utah Digital Signature Act
becomes a national model. If Alice wants to persuade a jury that
the pen-and-ink ("holographic") signature on a contract or note
is in fact Bob's, but Bob claims that it is a forgery, Alice must
bear the burden of proving that Bob's signature is genuine. Digital signatures are nearly impossible to forge, and the Utah Digital Signature Act thus reverses the presumption of authenticity
for digital signatures. Under the Utah Act, a digital signature
that can be verified by a valid certificate is presumed to belong to
115 For a discussion of the likely reception of digital signatures in Canadian law,
see Serge Parisien, Aspects Juridiques et Technologiques des Mdcanismes de
Signature llectronique: Une Analyse Comparative, available online URL http://

www.droit.umontreal.ca/Palais/Invites/AQDIJ/Colloque-O11-95/ Parisien/
parisienudm.html.
116 Because this Article already exceeds the length limits suggested by the editors
of this symposium volume, it does not include any discussion of choice of law issues.
117 For a discussion of the liabilities of a public CA, see BAUM, supra note 22.
118
See supra note 4.
119 See supra notes 6-8. As this Article went to press, Utah was joined by the
State of Washington. See supra note 4.
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the subscriber listed in the certificate. 2 °
Utah's presumption means that Alice can have greatly increased confidence in the enforceability of Bob's digital signature
so long as Alice can verify Bob's digital signature with a valid
certificate issued by a registered CA. This increased confidence
could be of great value in everything from automated microtransactions to large international transactions where the parties are
strangers.
On the other hand, the presumption creates a danger for a
consumer who loses control of his digital signature. Although
implementational details will vary, most digital signatures are
likely to be protected with at least a passphrase, a more complex
version of the PIN number that protects most bank cards today.
Some digital signatures may require both a passphrase and a
hardware token (for example, a smart card), or even the passphrase, the hardware token, and a biometric authentication (for example, a thumbprint scan). In the absence of the most heroic
biometric security measures, however, the consumer is at risk
that someone will acquire the hardware token and either guess
the passphrase or obtain it by eavesdropping or some other
means. If this happens, the Utah legislation creates a spectre of
unlimited liability that can only be capped once the consumer
reports that the digital signature has been compromised. Since
there is likely to be a lag between loss of control of the signature
and discovery of that fact, a reasonable consumer might well
choose to avoid this risk by not creating a digital signature at
all. 12 ' Utah's presumption seems considerably less unreasonable
when applied to large sophisticated organizations using the signatures for substantial transactions.
A.

Liability for Erroneous Certificates

Inevitably, certificates will issue with false statements, and
third parties will rely on them to their detriment. In the absence
of much state 122 or federal regulation, it will fall to the courts to
determine who should bear the liability when this happens. They
will have a difficult task.
46-3-406 (1996).
121 See Benjamin Wright, Eggs in Baskets: Distributing the Risks of Electronic
Signatures, availableonline URL httpJ/www.sig.net/-jbc/signatur.html.
122 See supra note 4 for a summary of state legislation to date.
120 UTAH CODE ANN. §
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1. Is a CA Selling a Good or a Service?
The difficulties in determining a CA's duties and liabilities begin with how one characterizes the CA's provision of a certificate: is the CA providing an investigative "service" of which the
certificate is an embodiment or memorial-much like a lawyer's
opinion letter or a valuer's opinion-or is the certificate that the
CA is selling a "good," or is the transaction a mixture of a good
and a service? The characterization determines whether Article
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) applies to the CA's
provision of a certificate.
If the CA is selling a "good," then Article 2 of the UCC applies. 123 If Article 2 applies, it brings with it a menu of default
rules, as well as provisions for statutes of limitation and express
and implied warranties including, in particular, the implied warranty of merchantability124 and the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 125 Article 2 of the UCC also imposes limits on
the disclaimers of those warranties. 126 Article 2 of the UCC is
not, however, uniform in ways that would matter greatly to CAs,
their customers, and relying third parties. For example, section
2-318 of the UCC offers states a choice of three different rules
governing the seller's warranty liability to third parties. One version of section 2-318 limits the run of the CA's warranties to persons in the family or household of the buyer, 127 but leaves the
common law unchanged as to the effect of the warranty on
"other persons in the distributive chain.' 1 28 A CA in such a state
will have whatever liability to third parties the common law of
the state imposes: for example, the liability for negligent misrepresentation discussed below. The UCC's second version of section 2-318 extends the run of the CA's warranties to all natural
persons "who may reasonably be expected to use

. . .

or be af-

fected by the goods.', 12 9 CAs subject to this provision will find
that they are subject to warranty claims for "defective" (that is,
123 U.C.C. § 2-102 (1994); see also
124 U.C.C. § 2-314.
125 U.C.C. § 2-315. An example of

note 132.

a claim under section 2-315 might be against a
CA that had provided a certificate signed with an insecure key or a key known to be
compromised.
26
1 See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ch. 12 (4th ed. 1995).
127 U.C.C. § 2-318, alternative A. This alternative is the most commonly used of
the three. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 126, at 392 n.3.
128 U.C.C. § 2-318, cmt. 3.
129 U.C.C. § 2-318, alternative B. This alternative is the least frequently used of
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erroneous) certificates to all natural third parties, since the reliance of such third parties could reasonably be expected. The
UCC's third version of section 2-318 includes artificial as well as
natural persons among the third parties who can make warranty
claims. 13 1 CAs in such states will provide the certificates that
should, all other things being equal, command the most trust;
they also will face the largest potential liability. The problem
from the point of view of a person trying to decide whether a
certificate is reliable is that they will not necessarily know which
of these provisions happen to apply unless the certificate tells
them. In addition to the three official versions of section 2-318, a
number of states use formulations of their own, further complicating matters.'
If the UCC applies to the sale of a certificate,
this lack of uniformity could impose a large burden on Bob when
Alice asks him to accept Carol's certificate. Unless Bob and Alice happen to live in the same state as Carol, they will need to
know which state's law applies, and whether that state's law allows Bob to take comfort from Carol's express and implied warranties about the reliability of her certificate.
If, on the other hand, the CA is selling a "service," then the
UCC Article 2 is by its own terms inapplicable.'32 It is not obvious that Article 2 should apply to the provision of a certificate.
UCC section 2-105(1) defines "goods" as "all things ... which are

moveable at the time of identification to the contract for sale
other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment
securities .. . and things in action.' 1 33 Since a certificate is highly
movable, it might seem to be a "good" under this definition. This
temptation should be resisted: a certificate is only a little closer
to the classic definition of a "movable good" than is a surveyor's
or valuer's report. A certificate resembles a professional's opinion in that a certificate ordinarily is the tangible memorial of a
the three, but it has been adopted in six states. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 126,
at 393 n.6.
130 U.C.C. § 2-318, alternative C. This alternative, or some form of it, is used in at
least eight states. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 126, at 393 n.7.
131 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 126, at 393 n.8.
132 See U.C.C. § 2-102 ("Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to transactions in goods ....
").Proposed revisions to Article 2 may extend its
coverage to include "service contracts." See Raymond T. Nimmer, Intangible Contracts: Thoughts of Hubs, Spokes, and ReinvigoratingArticle 2, 35 WM. & MARY L.

REv. 1337, 1374, 1389 (1994). This change would greatly increase the likelihood that
Article 2 applies to the provision of a certificate.
133 U.C.C. § 2-105(1).
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process of analysis in which the subject's credentials were
checked in some manner. On the other hand, a certificate differs
from a professional's opinion in some ways that may be relevant.
Any trustworthy CA will be managed by a professional-someone who knows how to run a trustworthy computer system-but
it is not inevitable that the actual checking of credentials in all
cases will be the sort of activity traditionally undertaken by professionals. If Carol's certificates are founded on checking the
subject's passport, it may well be that the person who actually
examines Alice's passport and issues her certificate is a clerk who
has been trained in passport authentication, not an expert like a
surveyor or valuer. There is no policy reason, however, why the
classification of a certificate as a good or service should turn on
whether the person making the report happens to be a professional. Furthermore, the certificate is not the only thing that the
CA sells. In addition to the certificate and the investigatory services that it embodies, the CA also maintains (or contributes to) a
CRL, without which
a certificate is untrustworthy and thus of lit34
tle or no value.1

Courts may, however, with some justice, view the CA's role as
combining elements of provision of a service and the sale of a
good. In such "mixed" cases, courts consider the applicability of
Article 2 of the UCC to be a question of fact concerning the nature of the transaction. If the seller is providing a hybrid of a
good and a service, the majority of states use a "predominant
factor" test to determine whether Article 2 of the UCC should
apply. 135 Under this test, the court attempts to determine the
parties' intentions as to what was important. If the transaction is
predominantly for the sale of goods, Article 2 of the UCC applies; otherwise it does not.'3 6 Other states either use a "final
product" test which looks at what is left when a contract is completed, 137 or attempt to determine which classification best serves
public policy. 138 As the courts have failed to achieve anything
approaching uniformity in how they characterize the facts about
See supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
& SUMMERS, supra note 126, at 3-4.
13 6 Id. at 3-4; see also Crystal L. Miller, Note, The Goods/Services Dichotomy and
the UCC.: Unweaving the Tangled Web, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 717, 720-23
(1984).
137 Miller, supra note 136, at 726.
138 Id. at 728-29.
134

135 WHrTE
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mundane transactions, 39 it is entirely possible that courts in different jurisdictions will disagree about how best to characterize a
CA's provision of certificates in the absence of legislation. Furthermore, some courts divide hybrid sales into the provision of a
"good" and a "service" and then apply Article 2 of the UCC to
the "goods" portion of the transaction. 40 CAs may be able to
manipulate this characterization in some jurisdictions. For example, a CA that gives a client a certificate may be more likely considered to be selling a "good" than a CA that enters into a
"service contract" by which the CA agrees to make the certificate available on a Web page to all who wish to see it.
The view that a CA is providing a service (or a hybrid in which
the service element predominates) appears more convincing than
the alternative under either the "predominant factor" test or the
"final product" test.141 Although it is true that a CA provides a
"movable" thing to the client, that thing is digitized information 42 which is essentially useless without other supporting information provided by the CA on a continuing basis. To issue a
certificate worthy of trust, the CA must: (1) have a valid and verifiable certificate of its own; (2) conduct the inquiry on which the
certificate will be based; (3) accurately state facts in the certificate, including both the facts about the subject and the facts
about the CA's investigation; and (4) maintain a CRL.14 3 The
CA's continuing duty to maintain the CRL in a form that can be
139

See 1 RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

CODE § 2-105:51 (3d ed. 1981); Miller, supra note 136, at 717-20.
140 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 126, at 3-4.
141 Whether this result best serves public policy is a difficult question, one which
may become easier to answer once certificate-based electronic commerce becomes
more commonplace and CAs have more of a track record.
142 One issue in this context is whether that information is an "intangible" since it
is generally but not universally agreed that Article 2 of the UCC does not apply to
intangibles. Several writers have argued that the UCC should apply to software,
even though it has properties that make it appear to be an "intangible." See, e.g.,
Andrew Rodau, Computer Software: Does Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code Apply?, 35 EMORY L.J. 853 (1986); Bonna L. Horovitz, Note, Computer
Software as a Good Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Taking a Byte Out of the
IntangibilityMyth, 65 B.U. L. REV. 129 (1985). Indeed, the courts that have spoken
on this issue appear to be in general agreement that the UCC should apply to
software. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Propertyand Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1249 n.38 (1995) (noting that "most courts and commentators
have concluded that distribution of mass-market software constitutes a sale of
goods, thus invoking the UCC"). It could be argued that a certificate on a disk is
more "tangible" than a certificate on a web site, but this privileges form over
substance.
143 ABA Draft Guidelines, supra note 4, § 3.11 cmt. 4.
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rapidly and efficiently used by persons wishing to rely on a certificate is in itself significant evidence that the service element predominates in what the CA is selling. On the other hand, a CA
which does no investigation at all and/or a CA that does not
maintain a CRL may not be providing a "service." In that case,
there is a real question whether the "good" being offered is fit
and proper for its purpose.
Article 2 is being revised to extend its reach to "intangibles"
such as computer software and data.'" Thus, even if a certificate
is outside the scope of Article 2 today, it does not necessarily
follow that it will be outside the scope of Article 2 as ultimately
revised. Nevertheless, so long as the revisions do not extend Article 2 to services, the argument that the service aspect of maintaining the CRL predominates over the sale of data as a "good"
should remain valid.
A decision that a CA provides a service does not resolve all
the ambiguities about a CA's liabilities in the absence of legislation, but it does provide a framework in which questions can be
asked and answered. The next section briefly examines one of
the ways in which a CA might face liability in the absence of a
statute or other norms defining the rights and duties of a CA in
order to demonstrate the legal complexities created by the introduction of a CA into a transaction. Of course, some scenarios
are easy: if a CA is willfully or grossly negligent, or a CA conspires with the subject of the certificate, the CA should obviously
be liable for its acts and omissions. Other scenarios, beyond the
scope of this preliminary exploration, are not as straightforward.
These include:
* The certificate is accurate, but the transaction goes wrong for
14 5
some other reason.
144 See Nimmer, supra note 132.
145 A CA should not be liable for

the ways in which accurate certificates may be
used by others. Both the Utah Digital Signature Act and the draft ABA Guidelines
create a safe harbor from liability for a CA that has made accurate representations
and complied with certain other requirements. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3304(4)(a) (providing for subscriber's indemnification of CA against claims due to
subscriber's misrepresentation); id. § 46-3-309(2) (creating safe harbor against liability in excess of reliance limit stated in certificate for licensed CAs and limiting recovery in tort to compensatory damages). As a general matter, this makes sense: there
is no reason why a CA should be involved in Alice's securities claim against Bob if
the CA's only involvement was to provide accurate identifying certificates for the
people involved. Of course, a different result would be appropriate if the CA provided an attesting certificate that was materially misleading. Different rules might
arguably be appropriate for certain consumer transactions.
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* The security of Alice's key is compromised and Mallet uses it,
along with146Alice's publicly available certificate, to impersonate Alice.

* Alice revokes her key because she learns of Mallet's actions,
but Mallet manages to transact during the period between Alice's revocation notice
to Carol and Carol's posting of a cer1 47
tificate revocation.
* The security of Carol's key is compromised and Mallet begins
1 48
issuing bogus certificates or bogus certificate revocations.
* Carol erroneously lists Alice's key as revoked, and Bob re149
fuses to transact with Alice.

* The "meltdown scenario": there is a major discovery in
number theory or computation and the algorithms on which
Alice and Carol's keys are based are no longer secure.
2.

Misrepresentation,Whether Wilful or Negligent, of CA's
Client, Not Detected by CA

Assume that Alice makes a negligent or wilful misrepresentation when procuring a certificate from Carol, a CA. The misrepresentation might be about Alice's identity, or her credit rating,
or her employment. Carol fails to detect the misrepresentation.
Alice then uses the certificate to transact with Bob, but either
fails to pay or defrauds Bob in some manner. Assume further,
for simplicity, that Bob can show that his reliance was reasonable, 150 that he would not have transacted with Alice but for her
146 Unless Alice and Carol have made a special arrangement, a CA should have
no duty to monitor the use of a certificate that they have agreed will be publicly
available. Once notified of a key compromise, a CA should have a duty to publish
this in the CRL "quickly." ABA Draft Guidelines, supra note 4, § 3.11 cmt. 4.
147 Presumably the critical issue in this scenario will be whether Carol acted
quickly enough. The common-law approach to this problem would rely on usages of
trade, but it is difficult to do this when (1) there is as yet no "trade" to speak of, and
(2) technology is changing very rapidly.
148 Liability here may in part depend on how the key was compromised. There
are differences between an inside job, penetration of Carol's systems by a hacker
(perhaps due to bad security), an extraordinarily lucky brute force attack on Carol's
key, advances in key-cracking technology (which raise the question whether these
advances should have been anticipated), or Carol's failure to update her keys.
149 This scenario resembles a bank dishonoring a check when there are sufficient
funds in an account or a credit card clearer erroneously reporting that a credit limit
has been exceeded or the card stolen.
150 The degree to which Bob's reliance actually was reasonable may turn on a
number of factors. One of the most important is the content of the certificate itself.
If the certificate states that it should not be relied on for transactions over five dollars, Bob's reliance on the certificate for a $1 million transaction is unreasonable.
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presentation of a verifiable certificate, and that the misrepresentation was material to the transaction.
If Carol made representations in the certificate as to the level
of the inquiry used to verify Alice's claims about herself, the first
issue is whether Carol should have detected Alice's misrepresentation given the promised level of inquiry. If Carol's practice
statement proudly advertises that certificates are handed out to
all comers, without any checking whatsoever, it is difficult to see
how Carol could justly be accused of any form of negligence, assuming she accurately parroted Alice's claims, as long as it remains unreasonable to assume that all CAs conduct a minimum
level of verification of their customers' assertions.1 5 1 At this
early stage in the development of certificate-backed electronic
commerce, there are no usages of trade that might help define
the standard of care that one might expect of a CA. There are, at
present, no licensing or professional bodies whose standards
could serve as the basis for a legal norm. 15 2 Perhaps some day
CAs, like doctors and lawyers, will not be allowed to disclaim a
minimum degree of investigation, or will only be allowed to disclaim after getting the client to acknowledge informed consent
based on reading harrowing disclosures of the risks, but in the
short term the representations contained in the certificate itself
are likely to be the starting-and ending-point for defining the
CA's duty to investigate. 15 3
If, however, Carol claims that her certificates only go to people
she has "thoroughly investigated,"' 5 4 it may be reasonable to find
that she was negligent in issuing the certificate containing the
false information submitted by Alice. By asserting that she conducted an independent investigation, Carol negates any defense
she may have as a mere republisher of Alice's statement. 15 5 And
151 But see supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text (suggesting that CA who
makes no representations as to service may be selling a "good" subject to UCC
because no service is provided).
152 A document such as the proposed ABA Digital Signature Guidelines, see
ABA Draft Guidelines, supra note 4, may in time come to play this role.
153 For a discussion of the similar problem of defining negligence in the absence of
established usages of trade for Internet security professionals, see Michael Rustad &

Lori E. Eisenschmidt, The Commercial Law ofinternet Security, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J.
213, 243-52 (1995).
154 See supra text accompanying note 37.
155 Unless they have reason to know of the errors, publishers and book distributors are not liable for errors in works they publish and sell. See, e.g., ALM v. Van
Nostrand Reinhold Co., 480 N.E.2d 1263 (I11.
App. 1985) (dismissing negligence
claim against publisher of allegedly unsafe "How To" book); Cardozo v. True, 342
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if Bob has reasonably relied on Carol's certificate to his detriment, Carol56 may be liable to Bob under either contract or tort
1
principles.
a. Liability in Contractfor Negligent Misstatements

Carol's potential contractual liability depends in part on with
whom she has a contract. Carol's contract may be with Alice, the
subject of the certificate, or it may be with another party, such as
Alice's employer. But Carol does not have a contract with Bob,
Alice's victim, who is the person most likely to sue. Nor does she
have a contract with David, who was impersonated by Alice.
(i) Liability to Alice

If Alice benefited from Carol's error, she is unlikely to sue. If
the error hurt Alice in some way, Alice's claim turns on Carol's
failure to detect Alice's own error. In such cases, Alice's recovery is likely to be limited by her breach of contract in misinforming Carol. Even if Alice were able to persuade a court to grant
her compensation, the measure of damages is likely to be restitution (that is, whatever Alice paid for the certificate) since she
appears to have neither a reliance interest nor an expectation
57
interest.1
(ii)

Liability to Alice's Employer

Carol may have issued Alice's certificate at the request of Alice's employer, TED Corp. By failing to detect the falsity of Alice's claim that she was TED's Vice President in charge of
purchasing when in fact she was a file clerk, Carol may have
breached her contract with TED Corp. If Alice used the certificate in a way that harmed TED Corp, perhaps by buying tickets
to Rio, TED Corp has a contract claim against Carol, although
Carol again may have a partial defense of contributory negligence on the part of TED Corp's apparent agent, Alice, and possibly against anyone else at the company who may have
corroborated her claims. Again, the measure of damages is likely
So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (holding UCC did not make book dealer liable to
purchaser of cookbook for lack of adequate warnings as to poisonous ingredients
used in recipe), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1977).
156 Other remedies are available if Article 2 of the UCC applies. See supra part
III.A.1.
157 See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936) (defining three types of contractual interests).
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to be restitution, since there is neither a reliance interest nor an
expectation interest, although this time the amount of the contract may be somewhat larger.
(iii) Liability to Bob, Whom Alice Defrauded
Bob's hope of recovering under the contract between Carol
and Alice (or Alice's employer) turns on his ability to characterize that contract as a third-party beneficiary contract of which he
was an intended beneficiary.' 58 Bob's ability to so characterize
himself may also affect his right to recover in tort in states that
adhere to a strong privity rule. 159
Traditionally, Bob's hopes would have been slim. The first Restatement of Contracts divided third-party beneficiaries into
three classes: "donee beneficiaries," "creditor beneficiaries" and
"incidental beneficiaries."' 60 Incidental beneficiaries have no
contractual right against either party to the contract. 161 Bob is
not a creditor beneficiary because the purpose of the contract
between Alice and Carol is not to confer a gift on him. According to the first Restatement, Bob is a donee beneficiary when "it
appears from the terms of the promise in view of the accompanying circumstances that the purpose of [Alice] in obtaining the
promise ...

is ...to confer upon [Bob] a right against [Carol]"

that Bob would not otherwise have. 62 While it is certainly correct that Alice procured the certificate from Carol in order to
show it to people like Bob and that this type of use was foreseeable, ordinarily there would be little reason to believe that Carol
knew or should have known that Alice intended to show the certificate to Bob. In the era when privity reigned, Bob would not
have been able to claim to be an intended beneficiary of the
agreement without
being specified as such when Alice procured
1 63
the certificate.
158 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1979); David M. Summers, Note, Third Party Beneficiaries and the Restatement (Second) Of Contracts, 67
CORNELL L. REv. 880 (1982).
159 See Gary Lawson & Tamara Mattison, A Tale of Two Professions: The ThirdParty Liability of Accountants and Attorneys for Negligent Misrepresentation, 52
OHIO ST. L.J. 1309, 1319 (1991).
16 0
See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133 (1932).
161 Id. § 147.
62
1 Id. § 133(1)(a).
163 See, e.g.,
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441,445 (N.Y. 1931) (Cardozo,
J.). Cardozo wrote:

In the field of the law of contract ...

the remedy is narrower where the
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Today, the picture is murkier. 64 "The Restatement First test,

the intent-to-benefit test and its variations, and the Restatement
Second tests are all inadequate and indeed largely meaningless.' 1 65 Courts have relaxed the privity requirement in contract,
as in tort,166 replacing it with tests such as
the balancing of various factors, among which are extent to
which the transaction was intended to affect the [beneficiary],
the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that
the [beneficiary] suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct
67 and the injury, and the
policy of preventing future harm.'
Nevertheless, courts remain reluctant to allow everyone be a po1 68
tential third-party plaintiff in contract actions.

Bob's position is not much clarified by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which provides that a third party may enforce

a contract if he is an "intended beneficiary," that is, "if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary [Bob] is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and . . . the
circumstances indicate that the promisee [Alice] intends to give
'
the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance. 169
Whether the contract between Alice and Carol was for Bob's
benefit or for Alice's depends entirely on how one chooses to
beneficiaries of the promise are indeterminate or general. Something more
must then appear than an intention that the promise shall redound to the
benefit of the public or to that of a class of indefinite extension.
Id.; Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 897 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.);
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §

145 (1932); see also

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

§ 147 ("An incidental beneficiary acquires by virtue of the promise no right against
the promisor or the promisee.").
16
4 See Harry G. Prince, Perfecting the Third Party Beneficiary Standing Rule
Under Section 302 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 25 B.C. L. REV. 919
(1984) (summarizing wide variety of judicial responses to third-party benefit claims).
165 Melvin A. Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358, 1385
(1992).
166 See William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MiNN. L. REV. 791 (1966) [hereinafter Fall of the Citadel]; William L.

Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099 (1960).
167 Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 687 (Cal. 1961) (citing Biakanja v. Irving, 320
P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958)), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
168 See e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 165, at 1374; Summers, supra note 158, at 893.
Note that the breach by Alice of her contractual promise to tell the truth may not
inevitably prevent recovery from Carol by a third party. See Lewis v. Benedict Coal
Corp, 361 U.S. 459 (1960).

But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS

§ 309(1)-(2); Eisenberg, supra note 165, at 1413 n.188.
169 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 302(1). For a dissection of this
section and its associated comments, see Eisenberg, supra note 165, at 1382-84.
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look at it. Alice procures the certificate in order to induce Bob
to transact with her. Alice wants Bob to rely on the certificate;
perhaps Carol does also since this enhances the market for her
product. 17 But Alice wants Bob to rely because it benefits her,
not because it benefits him. The glass is either too empty or too
full. Either the holder of the certificate, Alice, is the intended
beneficiary because the certificate gives her something to show to
Bob, or Bob is the intended beneficiary because without the benefit he will not transact with Alice. 17 1 Either no third party is
intended or they all are.
(iv)

Liability to David, Whom Alice Impersonated

Suppose that Alice persuades Carol to issue a certificate stating that Alice is David, an innocent third party. Alice then uses
this certificate to defraud Bob, or just runs up a large number of
debts she fails to pay. David may be justly aggrieved when a
parade of unhappy Bobs comes to his door demanding payment.
At the very least he will waste time straightening out the mess;
his credit rating may be damaged; he may have to pay a lawyer.
Like Bob, however, David's remedies, if any, are in tort. Indeed,
David's contractual case is nonexistent since there is not even an
argument that David was an intended beneficiary of the
agreement.
b.

Liability in Tort for Negligent Misrepresentation

Recovery in tort is generally premised either on the breach of
a duty of care, or on strict liability. 172 Unlike their contract
claims, the various parties' tort claims will in no way be undermined by any breach of contract Alice may have committed in
misrepresenting facts to Carol, except of course for Alice, who
170 Furthermore, the courts are not in agreement as to whether Alice's intent,
Carol's intent, or their joint intent should control. See Jean F. Powers, Expanded
Liability and the Intent Requirement in Third Party Beneficiary Contracts, 1993
UTAH L. REv. 67, 73-74.
171 There is great merit to Professor Eisenberg's complaint that:
the entire enterprise of finding an intent to benefit the third party as an end
is misguided. Except in some cases involving true donee beneficiaries, the
intent of the contracting parties is typically to further their own interests,
not the interests of a third party. Accordingly, the question whether there
is an intent to benefit the third party as an end normally cannot generate a
meaningful answer.
Eisenberg, supra note 165, at 1381.
172 See infra Part III.A.2.b(iv) (discussing imposition of strict liability on CAs).
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may suffer from estoppel, unclean hands, or comparative fault. If
Carol has a tort duty to issue accurate statements it exists outside
the contract. Nevertheless, the contours of Carol's duty of care
will, to a great extent, be defined by the representations she
makes about the level of inquiry she promises to make before
issuing a certificate. In a sense, therefore, the contract does define the tort; 17 3 anyone who relies on the certificate can reasonably be expected to take the trouble to read the terms
incorporated into the certificate. For example, if Carol says in
her certification practice statement, incorporated by reference in
the certificate, that she requires applicants to show their passports, but in fact failed to ask Alice to show hers, she is guilty of
negligence. Or, if Carol says that she checks passports, and did
so, but failed to notice that Alice presented a crude forgery that
could have been detected with ordinary care, 74 she is guilty of
negligence. Conversely, if Carol did everything she said she
would do, but Alice proffered a superbly faked passport, then
Carol is not guilty of negligence. Bob and David may still be
able to recover in this last case, however, if Carol is strictly liable
for the accuracy of her certificates. 175 Even if Carol is not strictly
liable, David may be such an attractive plaintiff that he stands to
176
recover if his lawyer can find a way to get him to the jury.
If Carol, the CA, breaches her duty of care in checking the
facts about Alice recited in the certificate, she potentially is liable
for making a negligent misrepresentation. 177 This liability may
173 Cf. RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF

TORTS § 299A cmt. c (1965) ("In the ordinary

case, the undertaking of one who renders services in the practice of a profession or
trade is a matter of contract between the parties .... ").
174 The definition of "ordinary care" is itself an issue. If there is an industry, trade
usages may supply a guide. See supra note 147. Otherwise, judges and juries will
have to resort to general principles of ordinary care by reasonable people in like
circumstances, whatever those may be.
175 See infra Part III.A.2.b(iv) (discussing applicability of strict liability to CAs).
176 Perhaps David's lawyer might accuse Carol of a privacy tort, or of casting
David in a false light by identifying him with the evil Alice.
177 The misrepresentation is clearly of a matter of fact, not opinion, as those terms
are used in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 538A, 548A.
In some cases one could also hypothesize other claims against Carol, including
false representation under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(2) (1994) (trademark), which requires neither privity nor negligence, or a privacy tort. If Alice manages to acquire a
certificate saying she is David, David may have a tort claim for appropriation of
name or likeness, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C ("One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability
to the other for invasion of his privacy."), or a false light claim against Carol, id.
§ 652E (publicity placing another in false light that is offensive, based on reasonable
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run to Bob (Alice's victim), to David (if Alice impersonated
him), to Alice's employer (if the certificate was pursuant to a
contract with the employer) and perhaps even to Alice, subject
to her contributory or comparative negligence or unclean hands
78
if she committed a fraud.'
A threshold issue, however, is to whom the negligent misrepresentation in the certificate is addressed. If Bob got his copy of
the certificate from Carol's Web site where she publishes certificates, Bob has a tort claim for a negligent misrepresentation that
1 79
Carol made directly to him, although contract privity is absent.
David cannot make this claim-he is a third party and his ability
to recover depends on how the applicable state's law treats third
parties claiming injury from negligent misrepresentation to another. On the other hand, if Carol gives the certificate to Alice
and Alice sends a copy of it to Bob, the negligent misrepresentation was made to Alice and Bob is reduced to a third party.
States differ greatly on when a third party can obtain redress
for negligent misrepresentations. 180 Some require only that the
third party's reliance be foreseeable; most follow the Restatement (Second) of Torts rule which is an uneasy, and sometimes
unclear, compromise between the two views; a few require contract privity.
(i) ForeseeabilityStates
A small, but perhaps growing, 81 number of states determine
who may bring a third party negligent misrepresentation claim by
applying traditional tort analysis focusing on foreseeability.
Carol clearly would be liable to Bob in these states, regardless of
how he obtained the certificate, since it is completely foreseeable
that persons such as Bob would rely on the certificate. Carol
should be liable to David as well, since it is foreseeable that a
person whose good name is misappropriated in a certificate will
person standard, subjects publisher to liability if published with knowledge of or
reckless disregard as to falsity), or perhaps even a new tort of impersonation.
178 See 9 STUART M. SPEISER, ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS §32:74, at
367 (1992).
179 There may be interesting choice of law problems if Carol and Bob live in different jurisdictions.
180 See generally Jordan H. Leibman & Anne S. Kelly, Accountants' Liability to
Third Partiesfor Negligent Misrepresentation:The Search for a New Limiting Principle, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 347 (1992).
181 James R. Adams, No Privity Requiredfor Negligent MisrepresentationAction,
60 DEF. COUNS. J. 601 (1993).
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be harmed. Both the equities and an economic analysis favor
David since he is completely innocent, had no notice, and there is
nothing he could have done to protect himself from Alice.
(ii) Restatement States
Most states follow the rule set out in section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts" 8 and allow a third party to sue if he
is within the group of actually foreseen (not all foreseeable)
users, the "limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance" to whom the author knows the "recipient intends to supply" the statement. 183 Unfortunately, the Restatement rule is
difficult to apply to a CA. The potential class of persons who will
be shown a certificate and asked to rely on it is large, much like
an appraiser's or accountant's report. Indeed, the potential class
is as large or larger than those who might rely on a report regarding a publicly traded security; the possible transactions are more
diverse and the reliance by the third party is more likely to be a
"but for" element of the transaction. Furthermore, any CA must
be aware of these facts. Because the whole point of having a
certificate is to enable the holder to show it to someone who will
rely on it, there is no question that the recipient of a valid and
verifiable certificate should be within the zone of foreseeable
users, that is, among those entitled to "justifiable reliance."'
182 See, e.g., Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 773 (Cal. 1992) (adopting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 approach). The relevant part of section
552 states:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in
any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies
false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their
justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise
reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the

information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection
(1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose
benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or
knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the
information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends

or in a substantially similar transaction.
OF TORTS § 552.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

183 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 552(2)(a); see, e.g., Rosenblum Inc. v.

Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 145 (N.J. 1983).
184 Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d at 772.
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The problem with this line of reasoning, however, is that it
seems to prove too much. While section 552 of the Restatement
(Second) is not a model of clarity, it is a compromise that was not
intended to expand the class of potential third-party plaintiffs to
the entire world. 8 5 The class of potential users of a certificate is
all users of electronic commerce, indeed all users of e-mail or the
World Wide Web, which may equal a good fraction of the world
someday; allowing a right of action to this entire group threatens
to collapse into the foreseeability test, and thus to exceed the
boundaries that section 552 was designed to create. There has
been a trend toward allowing third parties to assert negligent
misrepresentation claims against professionals, but this trend has
not been uniform across states, nor even across professions
within individual states. 86 Some have argued that professional
opinions such as audits are intended primarily for the benefit of
third parties and that accountants should therefore be liable to
these essentially foreseeable parties,' 87 but many others strongly
oppose this idea.188 Part of this debate concerns the extent to
which accountants can foresee the uses to which their clients will
put their work product, but commentators have also argued that
unfettered liability is disproportionate to the wrong, might discourage socially useful behavior (such as audits of litigationprone industries), might be expensive to administer, or might
otherwise impose greater social costs than benefits.' 89
The CAs' circumstances are materially different from the accountants' in one important respect. If Bob acquires a certificate
from Alice, that certificate has almost no value to Bob except as
a means of facilitating transactions with other parties. 190 Every
185 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. a (noting that liability for
negligent misstatement is more restricted than for fraudulent misrepresentation).
186 See Lawson & Mattison, supra note 159, at 1310.
187 See, e.g., Howard B. Wiener, Common Law Liability of the Certified Public

Accountant for Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 233, 250 (1983);
Richard D. Holahan, Jr., Note, Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. v. Peat
Marwick Main & Co.: Just in Case You Had Any Doubts-There Is No Tort of Negligent Misrepresentation in New York, 13 PACE L. REv. 763, 771-76 (1993).
188 See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-PartyLiability Necessary?, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 295 (1988); Thomas L. Gossman, The Fallacy of
ExpandingAccountants' Liability, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 213; John A. Siliciano,

Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform, 86 MICH. L. REv.
1929 (1988).
189 See, e.g., Siliciano, supra note 188, at 1944.
190 The picture is somewhat more complicated if Alice's employer obtains the certificate for Alice, since the certificate may have uses within the organization.
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recipient of a certificate who suffers because of the CA's negligence thus falls squarely within the Restatement (Second) section 552 class of persons who suffer loss "through reliance upon
[the negligent misrepresentation] in a transaction that [the CA]
intends the information to influence or knows that the recipient
so intends or in a substantially similar transaction." '91 It may be
that the CA's resulting liability is unfairly large or socially detrimental, but it is hardly incidental or unexpected.
(iii) Privity States

A few states, notably New York, still follow the older rule that
if Bob is a third party he can only recover for Carol's negligent
misrepresentation to Alice (that Alice then furnished to him) if
he is in a relation of privity with Carol, although some of these
states slightly relax the qualifications for privity. 192 The policy
reason for attempting to limit the class of potential plaintiffs
claiming negligent misrepresentation is in deference to what are
considered to be legitimate fears of indeterminate liability to
third persons. In the infamous words of Justice Cardozo in UltramaresCorporationv. Touche, "If liability for negligence exists,

a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an
'193
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.
The classic cases about negligent misrepresentation, such as
Ultramares,involve a common fact pattern in which Bob receives
Carol's negligent misrepresentation (regarding, for example, an
accountant's report) from Alice. If Bob got the certificate from
Alice, his third party negligent misrepresentation claim hews
closely to the Ultramares facts, giving Bob little hope of recovery
against Carol in a privity state.
Bob's position in a privity state such as New York is more complicated if he got Alice's certificate directly from Carol's Web
site. It is as if the accountants in Ultramares had published the
accounts to the world with their client's consent. Yet, Bob still
191 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §552(2)(b). Arguably these third parties
are thus within the "limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance [Alice]
intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it,"
id. § 552(2)(a), even if this "limited group" is in fact limited only to those with
computers.
192 See 9 SPEISER, supra note 178, § 32:75, at 370.
193 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
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has no contract privity with Carol. As a formal matter, staying
squarely within the language of Ultramares, Bob's claim is unchanged. Nor does the direct provision of the certificate have
any formal effect on Bob's status as a potential third-party beneficiary of the contract-a status that would substitute for privity19 4 -since Carol and Alice's intentions are a necessary element
of Bob's third-party beneficiary contract claim,1 95 and their intentions are not affected by the mode of delivery.
Carol's claim that she did not foresee Bob's reliance rings particularly hollow if she placed Alice's certificate on the World
Wide Web herself rather than giving it to Alice; Bob's claim of
justifiable reliance on a certificate published by Carol in this
manner seems strong. Nevertheless, since a certificate issued by
Carol is used, foreseeably, by the same people in the same way
for the same purposes regardless of whether it happens to pass
through Alice's hands on the way to Bob, it seems overly formalistic to make a distinction between the legal consequences of the
two distribution models. Indeed, with the exception of the case
where Alice notifies Carol that she intends to give Bob the certificate, Bob is just as much-or as little-an intended third party
beneficiary whether Alice publishes the certificate or Carol does.
Because in practice the two distribution methods are barely distinguishable, especially when one considers that Carol continues
to manage the CRL regardless of who distributes the certificate,
there is a danger that Bob's tort claim would fail in a strong privity state such as New York even if he got Alice's certificate directly from Carol. 196
Whatever this result may say about general tort principles applicable in New York, it is not a sensible result in the special
context of a CA who issues a certificate at the request of a client,
particularly if the CA publishes the certificate. The rule in
Ultramares was crafted to protect accountants and other professionals from being subjected to unforeseen, arguably unforeseeSee Lawson & Mattison, supra note 159, at 1319.
See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
196 Cf. Holahan, supra note 187. A CA that wanted to take on liability in such a
state in order to signal that its certificates were reliable would either have to draft a
contract that made its intentions very clear, or it might have to adopt a business
model in which Carol does not put Alice's certificate on a web page, and does not
make it available to all, but instead provides an automated e-mail credential response service in which Carol meters Alice's usage of the certificate, and perhaps
charges accordingly.
194
195
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able, liability by the actions of a client in cases where the person
issuing a report could reasonably believe that the report was for
the client's own, private, use.' 9 7 A CA issuing a certificate, especially an identifying certificate, knows full well that the client's
entire purpose in acquiring the certificate is to show it to third
parties who will rely on it. By publishing the certificate itself, the
CA removes itself from the Ultramares facts. Even if the client
publishes the certificate, the CA must logically know that the client intends to do so. The CA cannot, therefore, credibly claim
surprise when an unknown third party relies on the certificate in
a manner consistent with the CA's representations in that certificate because the certificate exists solely to be relied upon by
strangers. The common law should reflect this reality, particularly in the case where the CA itself is the publisher, even in a
strong privity state.
(iv)

Strict Liability for CAs?

Strict liability is most commonly applied in cases involving
goods, such as defective products, and ultrahazardous activities.
Furthermore, strict liability traditionally allows recovery for personal injury but not for "economic loss." Traditionally, strict liability would thus seem to have had little to do with the issuance
of certificates: they are not ultrahazardous in the usual sense of
the term, 198 and they are probably not "products.' ' 199 However,
one commentator suggests that a certificate which used a faulty
algorithm to produce the CA's digital signature might be found
to have a design defect.2 0° Given that some jurisdictions separate
"hybrid" good-service transactions into the part that is a good
and the part that is a service,20 1 it may be useful to consider
briefly the economic principles that might underlie the imposition of strict liability as they apply to certificates as "goods." Indeed, there is a policy argument that a regulatory approach to
the law of certification authorities might want to take these factors into account in assigning liability, particularly in the absence
197

See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
But see supra text at notes 120-21 (discussing proposals to make consumers
presumptively liable for all transactions with their digital signature supported by
valid certificate).
199 See supra text accompanying notes 133-34 (making the argument that certificate is not a "good" for UCC purposes).
2
oo BAUM, supra note 22, at 130-31.
201 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
198
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of the consensus as to what constitutes due care for a CA needed
to give teeth to the CA's duty of care.
Imposition of a strict liability regime eliminates the need to
find privity: liability follows the good. 20 2 There is no requirement
that plaintiff show fault by defendant; instead, the sole issue is
whether the product performed adequately. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 402A imposes strict liability on products with an unreasonably dangerous defect. 20 3 Prosser defined
this class of products as those which are "not safe for such a use
that can be expected to be made of [them], and no warning is
given. ""204

The Learned Hand test, as reformulated by Dean Calabresi,
suggests that courts should impose strict liability on the least-cost
avoider.25 As between Carol and anyone but Alice, Carol will in
most cases be the least-cost avoider of the loss caused by an inaccurate certificate. If Alice and Bob are strangers, Bob has no
means of testing the validity of the representations in the certificate: his inability to confirm Alice's claims about herself is the
precise reason he wants the certificate in the first place. 20 6 As
between Carol and Alice, however, Alice is ordinarily the leastcost avoider of Alice's errors.
The net effect of a policy that makes Alice strictly liable to
everyone for her own errors in a certificate, and makes the CA
strictly liable to everyone but Alice for the CA's failure to detect
Alice's misstatements, would be to turn the CA into an insurer
for Alice's veracity in every case where Alice disappears or lacks
the assets to satisfy a judgment.2 °7 There is also a danger that
imposing strict liability on Carol removes the incentive for Alice
to take care that her statements to Carol are accurate. For Carol
to agree to be a CA under these terms would require that Alice
provide either extraordinarily strong assurances as to her claims,
202 See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
203 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. i (1977) (discussing defini-

tion of "unreasonably dangerous").
20 4
Prosser, Fall of the Citadel, supra note 166, at 826.
20 5
See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1970); Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1077 (1972).

206 See generally Part I supra.
207 There is also some danger that under a strict liability regime, the fact that
Carol was willing to become an insurer for Alice might itself be a signal that Carol
was not trustworthy.
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or that Carol charge prices large enough to pay for a generous
insurance cover.
B.

ContractualAttempts to Limit Private CA Liability

Even absent strict liability, the current uncertainty as to the
state of the law gives a CA an incentive to be overcautious. A
lawyer retained by a CA is likely to respond by attempting to
have the CA disclaim any responsibility for anything it says.
Thus, for example, the disclaimer offered by an early entrant to
this market, in its standard contract with purchasers of certificates entitling them to run a Netscape-compliant "secure server,"
states:
VERISIGN DISCLAIMS ANY WARRANTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE SERVICES PROVIDED BY VERISIGN
HEREUNDER INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION
ANY AND ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE. VERISIGN MAKES NO REPRESENTATION
OR WARRANTY THAT ANY CA OR USER TO WHICH
IT HAS ISSUED A DIGITAL ID IN THE VERISIGN SECURE SERVER HIERARCHY IS IN FACT THE PERSON
OR ORGANIZATION IT CLAIMS TO BE WITH RESPECT TO THE INFORMATION SUPPLIED TO VERISIGN. VERISIGN MAKES NO ASSURANCES OF THE
ACCURACY, AUTHENTICITY, INTEGRITY, OR RELIABILITY OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN DIGITAL
IDS OR IN CRLs COMPILED, PUBLISHED OR DISSEMINATED BY VERISIGN, OR OF THE RESULTS OF
CRYPTOGRAPHIC METHODS IMPLEMENTED. NO
ORAL OR WRITTEN INFORMATION OR ADVICE
GIVEN BY VERISIGN OR ITS EMPLOYEES OR REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CREATE A WARRANTY OR
IN ANY WAY INCREASE THE SCOPE OF VERISIGN'S
OBLIGATIONS. SOME JURISDICTIONS DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES,
SO THE
ABOVE EXCLUSION MAY NOT APPLY TO
208
YOU.

Leaving aside the issue of the enforceability of this language, especially as applied to third parties,2 °9 if Carol in fact "makes no
208 VeriSign Corp., Secure Server Legal Agreement 3, available online URL http:/
/www.verisign.com/netscape/legal.html.
209 In California, where VeriSign is located, the disclaimer will not work if a certificate is a good because an "as is"disclaimer or one which disclaims "all implied
warranties that would otherwise attach to the sale of consumer goods under the
provisions of this chapter," CAL. CIV. CODE § 1791.3 (West 1985), must be "a conspicuous writing ... attached to the goods." Id. § 1792.4(a). It is unclear how one
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representation or warranty" that the holder of one of her identifying certificates "is in fact the person or organization it claims to
be with respect to the information supplied to" Carol, and if she
also disclaims "the accuracy, authenticity, integrity, or reliability
of information" the certificate provides, one is entitled to ask
how much point there is to having one of Carol's certificates.21 0
The answer depends primarily on what Alice and Bob decide
they need in order to feel comfortable transacting with each
other. If a certificate provides transactional confidence, at least
in the absence of alternatives, then it suffices. Carol's desire to
protect her service's reputation may, in any case, provide Alice
and Bob with some comfort that Carol has been verifying the
accuracy of Alice's assertions.
Similarly, because the law today offers a CA no obvious means
of pegging its liability according to the degree of investigation
that went into a certificate, a CA in operation today may seek to
reduce its liability to the minimum. Again, VeriSign provides an
example in its standard contract:
NEITHER PARTY WILL BE LIABLE TO THE OTHER
FOR ANY CONSEQUENTIAL, INDIRECT, SPECIAL OR
INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, WHETHER FORESEEABLE
OR UNFORESEEABLE, ARISING OUT OF BREACH
OF ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTY,
BREACH OF CONTRACT, MISREPRESENTATION,
NEGLIGENCE, STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT OR
OTHERWISE, EXCEPT ONLY IN THE CASE OF WILLFUL MISCONDUCT, DEATH OR PERSONAL INJURY
WHERE AND TO THE EXTENT THAT APPLICABLE
LAW REQUIRES SUCH LIABILITY. THE PARTIES
AGREE THAT VERISIGN'S TOTAL LIABILITY HEREUNDER SHALL NOT EXCEED THE AMOUNTS PAID
BY CUSTOMER TO VERISIGN UNDER THIS AGREEachieves this for a certificate. For a survey of limits on disclaimers in the U.S. see
Donald F. Clifford, Jr., NoN-UCC STATUTORY PROVISIONS AFFECTING WARRANTY
DISCLAIMERS AND REMEDIES IN SALES OF GOODS, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1011 (1993).
210 Indeed, one can imagine a court throwing out the disclaimers as unconscionable. See U.C.C. § 2-302; see also id. at cmt. 1 (suggesting courts should strike as
unconscionable clauses "contrary to public policy or to the dominant purpose of the
contract"). This section has been applied to many kinds of contracts other than those
for goods "either by analogy or as an expression of a general doctrine." E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTHi, CONTRACrS § 4.28, at 325 (2d ed. 1990); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CoNTRcrs § 208 (1979); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (West 1985).
Compare Wile v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903 (Kan. 1976) (finding disclaimers of liability for error in telephone book not unconscionable) with Allen v.
Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 232 N.W.2d 302 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (finding disclaimers
for errors in telephone book to be unconscionable).
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MENT EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH LIABILITY AROSE FROM VERISIGN'S WILLFUL
MISCONDUCT. SOME JURISDICTIONS DO NOT
ALLOW THE LIMITATION OR EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY FOR INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES, SO THE ABOVE LIMITATION
OR EXCLU2 11
SION MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU.
With this disclaimer, the CA seeks to limit its liability to its client
for anything other than its own "willful misconduct" to the
amount the subscriber paid for the certificate, which is likely to
be a very small sum in most cases. The desire to limit liability in
this manner is a response to the largely unpredictable and potentially capacious liability that a CA might encounter in the absence of a statute or other norms defining its rights and duties.
Unfortunately, this response threatens to undermine the certificate itself. A certificate that contains a warning that it is not to
be trusted seems ill-suited to fill a trust-building role in electronic
commerce. A world in which such warnings are routinely given
and routinely ignored suggests that at least one party's expectations will be disappointed.
C. Is CA Legislation Needed to Resolve Liability for an
Erroneous Certificate?
A CA's fundamental duty, whether in contract or tort, should
be to make accurate representations in a certificate. In a certificate worthy of reliance, these representations will concern not
only facts about the subject of the certificate, but also facts about
the CA itself. To inspire confidence, a certificate should state (or
incorporate by reference) the identity of the CA, the facts upon
which the identification of the subject of the certificate is based,
the degree of investigation performed by the CA to confirm the
facts stated by the subject of the certificate, the start and end
dates of the certificate's validity and the location of the relevant
CRL. CAs might choose to include additional information, such
as a recommended reliance limit for transactions based on the
certificate.
One can imagine that as the number of CAs grows, certificates
will eventually begin to be issued that bear all the indicia of reliability through the operation of market mechanisms. This is an
uncertain process, however, and it is not instantaneous. Further211

VeriSign Corp., supra note 208, at 3.
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more, the existing uncertainty about the substantive law applicable to CAs increases the risk involved in running one. All other
things being equal, this will raise the cost of certificates, as riskaverse parties may be unwilling to enter the market, reducing the
number of competitors:
1.

The Case for Legislation

The case for legislation begins with the observation that the
legal climate for CAs is uncertain. Uncertainty increases costs
and discourages transactions.212 In the case of CAs it threatens
to produce overpowerful incentives for CAs to underproduce
certificates and/or disclaim all liability for certificates, which
threatens to limit their utility. 213 It is also likely to lead to considerable litigation until all the relevant rules are identified.
As we have seen, absent legislation a CA's liability is potentially high. Much of the social benefit of having a certificatebased system of electronic commerce is foregone if Carol's exposure to liability is so high that the cost of insurance is enormous.
In that case Carol will self-insure, and declare bankruptcy if a
large claim is decided against her, which does not help the injured parties and creates a risk that CAs will not last. Alternately, Carol will have to charge high prices and issue few
certificates, which also defeats the purpose of the system.
A CA's liability can be fixed by legislation, but this requires a
policy choice as to what the appropriate level of liability should
be. The Utah Act provides one model. Under that Act, a CA
that complies with relatively onerous requirements2 14 is granted
a safe harbor from consequential damages, and indeed from most
liability in excess of a reliance limit stated in the certificate, even
if the CA itself is guilty of a negligent misstatement.2 15 It is certainly possible to imagine other levels at which the CA's liability
212 See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code,
10 U. FLA. L. REV. 367 (1957).
213 However, the existence of standards such as X.509 impose significant con-

straints on CA behavior. For example, to comply with X.509 a CA must uniquely
identify itself in a certificate. See Ford, supra note 23, at 12. Failure to produce a
certificate that complies with the standard designed into systems that use certificates
will result in users rejecting the certificate.
214 These requirements include: having a secure system, trusted personnel, clear
certification policies, insurance, a CRL, a certificate from the root CA operated by
the state, regular financial audits of its balance sheet, and regular security audits of
its computer systems. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-201, -202, -203, -301, -307.
215 The Utah Act states that a CA which complies with its terms is:
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might be fixed in the event that it is negligent, levels which create
an additional incentive to be careful but fall short of open-ended
liability.216
Another reason legislation might be needed is to make provisions for certificates issued by a CA that later goes out of business. A CA cannot recall all of its certificates; a bankrupt CA
might have no incentive to even notify its former clients that it
was ceasing operations. Some certificates, particularly transactional certificates, may be on documents with a long lifespan.
The need to check the validity of the digital signatures on a deed
may not arise until many years after it is affixed, but the need is
no less real. If the CA is to go out of business in a manner that
does not undermine the utility of such certificates, someone must
be found to store the certificates that validate the CA's key and
to take over the management of the CA's CRL, without which all
of its certificates must be considered unreliable.217
Legislation may also serve the goal of consumer protection
(depending on its content), since a statute can require that CAs
carry insurance or reserves to meet any claims for their errors.
CAs resemble notaries public in that both verify the authenticity
of signatures, and it may follow that, like notaries, CAs "require
some level of licensing by governmental entities" to ensure public confidence.21 8
B. not liable in excess of the amount specified in the certificate as its recommended reliance limit for either:
(I) a loss caused by reliance on a misrepresentation in the certificate
of any fact that the licensed certification authority is required to
confirm; or
(II) failure to comply with [rules relating to the proper issuance of a
certificate] in issuing the certificate;
C. liable only for direct, compensatory damages in any action to recover a
loss due to reliance on the certificate, which damages do not include:
(I) punitive or exemplary damages;
(II) damages for lost profits, savings, or opportunity; or
(III) damages for pain or suffering.
Id. § 46-3-309(2).
216 On the other hand, once the decision to have comprehensive legislation has
been made, the case seems overwhelming for reemphasizing that a CA should never
be liable for anyone's use of an accurate certificate that the CA had no reason to
suspect was no longer accurate-even if this is certain to be the common-law result
absent legislation.
217 Utah addresses these issues in its administrative rules issued pursuant to Section 104 of the Utah Digital Signature Act. See id. § 46-3-104(3).
218 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Access to the National Information Infrastructure, 30
WAKE FoREST L. REv. 51, 100 (1995). On the other hand, equal public confidence
might be achieved by clear legal rules which either impose liability on CAs for their
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A single standard should also prevent the duplicative litigation
that would otherwise be required to identify the relevant rules in
many jurisdictions. Furthermore, the likelihood that different jurisdictions will have different liability rules reduces the utility and
ease of use of certificates. Without new laws, uniformity among
states, much less among nations, is unlikely. The American Bar
Association is working on Guidelines for Digital Signatures,2 19
and the Commissioners on Uniform Laws are studying the issue.
While the liability and uncertainty arguments have power, the
strongest argument for legislation is that it would create an opportunity to standardize the rights and duties of CAs, their customers, and those who rely on certificates, regardless of the
jurisdiction in which they happen to reside. It is possible to imagine a system in which users grade certificates according to the
liability regime that applies, but it seems unwieldy and inefficient
to force users (or their software) to take account of factors such
as the effect of the geographical location of the CA and the trading parties on the choice of law. This is especially true when information about geographical location may not necessarily be
accessible to participants in Internet commerce.2 2 ° Users cannot
reasonably be expected to keep abreast of changes in the law of
multiple jurisdictions, and the challenge of programming a certificate system to do more than classify certificates by their reliance
limits seems daunting. One can imagine the introduction of yet
another intermediary that would perform this rating function,
but requiring the introduction of a trusted fourth party to rate
trusted third parties seems to be too much of a good thing. A
uniform national or even international rule would be much easier
to understand and to administer.
2.

The Case Against Legislation

The case against new legislation is that it would be too much
too soon, and perhaps too unfair. First, although the idea of a
CA is not new, commercial CAs are so new that the industry
barely deserves to be called a fledgling. At this stage, with few
providers, few clients, and few certificates, it is difficult to foresee
how certificates will actually be used with sufficient precision to
errors or at least make it possible for CAs to signal their confidence in their certificates by undertaking a measured amount of liability.
219 See ABA Draft Guidelines, supra note 4.
220 See generally Froomkin, supra note 21.
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draft rules that will last. Any statute written today, including the
Utah Act, is a first draft. Second, it is at least conceivable that
the marketplace will provide an adequate solution without regulation. If a competitive market in certificates arises, it is possible
that a struggle to the top 221 (or market stratification) may ensue,
and that CAs may find that a willingness to back their certificates
their certificates
with at least some kind of guarantee may make
222
more attractive to clients and third parties.
The clients' interests depend in large part on how they plan to
use the certificate. If Alice plans to use the certificate to transact
with Bob, Alice wants the least expensive certificate that Bob
will find acceptable.223 Bob, on the other hand, may want a certificate that gives him recourse against the CA if Alice succeeds
in defrauding him and turns out to be an imposter. Similarly,
Alice's demands regarding the assurances she wants to receive
about Bob will play a large role in the level of assurance Bob will
want to be able to display. In other words, neither Alice's nor
Bob's interests are necessarily well served by a world in which
CAs have no liability to either of them under any circumstances.
The CA itself may benefit from a regime in which it at least has
the option of taking on liability to demonstrate its confidence in
the certificates. Although the Utah Act allows CAs to take on
additional liability if they want, market pressures arguably may
produce optimal outcomes without regulation.
Even if Carol says that her Class A certificates are not suitable
to transactions of more than five cents, Alice may be able to use
the certificate millions of times in an hour. It might, however, be
possible for Carol to say that Class A certificates are only suitable for transactions of five cents or less and that each individual
third party may rely on a certificate only once per day. This
would impose an additional, but perhaps not unreasonable, recordkeeping obligation on Bob since now he has to make sure
that Alice has not used the certificate with him that day. Bob is
of course free to dispense with this recordkeeping, but if he does
so he bears the risk that the certificate is erroneous because his
221 See generally Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection,and the
Theory of the Corporation,6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).

222 The Utah Act allows CAs to take on additional obligations to clients or others
if they so desire. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-302(3).

223 If Alice plans to transact with many people, she will have to trade the expense
of the certificate against the likelihood that it will be accepted by those with whom
she wishes to transact.
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reliance on the certificate in excess of its terms is not justified.
Even if such a scheme were feasible, it would only protect Bob
against overreliance on a once-a-day certificate. It would not
protect Alice against Mallet's misuse of her signature if he gained
control of it. Because a digital signature supported by a valid
certificate can be used to transact with a very large number of
people in a short period of time, only usage monitoring by the
CA itself, or by the CA's agent managing a unique CRL, could
turn the reliance limit into an effective protection against multiple use. Unfortunately, there is reason to doubt whether it is
technically and economically feasible for a CA to do this; 224 there
has been no suggestion that any potential CA is interested in
shouldering this substantial burden.
Utah's approach to the CA liability question creates two categories of CAs. Those that comply with the relatively strict requirements of the Utah Act by proving their technical and
financial security can benefit from a very safe harbor from liability for erroneous certificates. 225 Noncomplying CAs are left to
the tender mercies of the background law. The commentary to
the Utah law notes that CA liability limits are justified because
"one of the principal impediments to the emergence of certification authorities has been the uncertainty of the legal risks such a
'
business would undertake."226
Indeed, when the Utah Act was
enacted in early 1995, there were no commercial CAs offering
certificates to the public in the United States, nor were there any
as of February 1, 1996.
By early 1996, however, Netscape 2.x browsers came equipped
to recognize certificates issued by CommerceNet, MCI Mall,
ATT,RSA, and Netscape.227 Although at this writing these entities have yet to begin issuing certificates on a large scale, it seems
plausible that they will do so even in the absence of legislation.
If they do begin issuing certificates on a large scale in the absence
224 One of several obstacles to any system that seeks to count the number of uses
of a certificate is that both certificate lists and CRLs are easily copied. If Bob runs a
high-volume, low-margin business, in many cases it will be far more efficient for him
to copy an entire CRL at random intervals, and take the risk of honoring a revoked
certificate from time to time, than to continually contact the CA to check individual
certificates.
225 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-309.
226 Id., cmt. a, available online URL www.state.ut.us/ccjj/digsig/dsnt-act.htm.
227 Netscape 2.01, Options menu, Security Preferences menu, Site Certificates
menu; see generally Netscape Handbook: Application Features, available online
URL http://home.netscape.com/eng/mozilla/2.01/handbook/docs/appans.html#C37.

Trusted Third Parties in Electronic Commerce

of legislation, the argument that they require substantial protection from liability in order to enter the market will be at least
weakened, and perhaps even proved wrong. "Perhaps" is, however, the strongest word appropriate at this time. The willingness
of large organizations to enter the market in advance of legislation that they may reasonably expect will provide liability shields
does not necessarily prove that they would remain willing to issue certificates if it became clear that the legislation was not going to materialize. Some CAs may choose to take a calculated
short-term risk to expose themselves to high liability in order to
grab market share and create brand name recognition. These
same CAs might be unwilling to shoulder the risk in the long
term. Nevertheless, to an opponent of legislation, "perhaps" is
good enough since the crux of the argument is that one should
wait and see.
Similarly, the opponent of legislation is unlikely to be fazed by
the preliminary evidence that fear of liability has forced one CA
to include scattershot disclaimers in its certificates.2z 8 Even if
one agrees that if this practice persisted it would risk undermining the utility of certificates, there is arguably little to be gained
by legislating before the market for certificate policies has had an
opportunity to reach equilibrium. 29
Finally, if the market requires standardized rules, the competition between states may provide them without federal assistance,
as demonstrated by the predominant role of Delaware's corporate law.2 3 ° Perhaps Utah, or some other state, or even a foreign
country, will become the address of choice for CAs that wish to
signal their trustworthiness.
3.

The ABA Digital Signature Guidelines

One of the difficulties in determining the duties and liabilities
of CAs in the absence of legislation is the paucity of trade practices or best practices.2 31 A further difficulty is that lawyers and
judges are generally unfamiliar with the purpose and functions of
digital signatures and CAs. The ABA Section on Science and
See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
229 A supporter of legislation would be likely to counter that the process of finding this equilibrium would requires enormous amounts of wasteful litigation.
230 Cf. Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of
Takeover Statutes, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 843 (1993) (discussing competition among
states for the business of corporate charters).
231 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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Technology's Information Security Committee is attempting to
address these problems with its Digital Signature Guidelines. At
this writing, the first, still unofficial, exposure draft is being revised.2 32 This Article has avoided discussing the Draft Guidelines because of their preliminary nature and the likelihood that
they might change significantly by the time this Article is published. Whatever their final form, however, it is already clear
that the Guidelines stand a chance of influencing both the practice and regulation of CAs and that they warrant careful
reading.233
CONCLUSION

Persons who are not previously acquainted, but wish to transact with one another via computer networks such as the Internet,
will need a means of identifying or authenticating each other.
One means of achieving this is to introduce a trusted third party
into the bilateral relationship. This third party, a Certification
Authority, can vouch for a party by issuing a certificate identifying her, or attesting that she possesses a necessary qualification
or attribute. CAs may become essential to much, but not all,
electronic commerce. Although at this writing there are few CAs
in operation, and what electronic commerce takes place rarely
relies on certificates, the dollar value of electronic commerce is
forecast to grow quickly. If it does, the demand for CA's services
should grow rapidly as well.
Outside the states of Utah and Washington, which have passed
comprehensive digital signature acts but currently have no CAs
qualified to take advantage of their terms, state rules likely to be
applicable to CAs are unclear. Basic concepts, such as whether a
CA's sale of a certificate is the sale of a "good," a "service," or
the mixture of the two for UCC Article 2 purposes, remain to be
determined. State common-law rules concerning the liability of a
CA for negligent misrepresentations in a certificate are anything
but uniform, and in some cases likely to be unclear also.
The more general lack of regulatory and legal standardization
that these examples evince may prove to be a large impediment
232 ABA Draft Guidelines, supra note 4. The comment period ended January 15,
1996.
233 In the spirit of full disclosure, I should confess that I am a quondam member
of the ABA's Information Security Committee and was involved in drafting parts of
the draft Guidelines.
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to the development of reliable electronic commerce. A national-or even possibly international-standard for accurately
signaling what a certificate promises, and the extent to which a
certificate can reasonably engender reliance, may be needed.
Such a standard is unlikely to emerge until the relevant legal
rules that already exist are identified; the development of standards is also likely to be retarded by the great diversity of legal
regimes in different jurisdictions that may be involved in a single
transaction. Whether it would be best to produce the needed
legal standardization through legislation, the judicial process, or
market mechanisms such as the bargaining process and the usages of trade, is debatable. However, until some standardization
is achieved, users of digital signatures will find it difficult to determine what degree of commercial reliance to place on a representation in a certificate.
Standards aside, the current uncertainty about the law creates
a climate in which CAs have an enormous incentive to understate the reliability of their certificates in order to avoid exposure
to liability whose contours are difficult to predict. This understandable behavior undermines the justified reliance that CAs
should be designed to achieve; if it persists, legislation to balance
CA incentives and liability is likely to become necessary. State
legislation holds out the promise of clearer rules and the avoidance of much litigation, but today this clarity comes at the price
of having to determine the distributional consequences of mistakes by CAs and the people who use certificates before there is
any significant evidence of the nature and patterns of certificate
use and abuse.
After a reasonable period of experimentation in which marketdriven certificates that do not purport to be worthless have a
chance to surface, it will be appropriate to consider whether the
national interest in a functioning national information infrastructure might be better served by uniform national rules. The CA
equivalent of Delaware's corporate law might emerge from a
competition among state regulatory authorities. If not, uniformity could be achieved via the traditional channels for state law
harmonization, such as model laws and uniform acts, or by federal legislation. In addition to these national standards, at least
minimal international norms for certificate recognition and CA
regulation will become increasingly necessary as electronic commerce becomes more global.

